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PRECEDENT TIMES THREE: STARE





CTOBER 1, 1981, will mark a milestone in the history of our fed-
eral courts. On that day, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reor-
ganization Act of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the
Reorganization Act)' will divide the "former Fifth Circuit" into two com-
pletely autonomous judicial circuits: the "new Fifth Circuit," composed of
the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and the
new "Eleventh Circuit," composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
2
This Article considers the novel issues of stare decisis raised by this divi-
sion. The Article begins by establishing an historical context, tracing
briefly the evolution of the United States Courts of Appeals and the partic-
ular developments leading to the scheduled division. The initial inquiry to
be addressed is whether the judges of the two new circuits should consider
themselves bound by precedents of the former Fifth Circuit. Enmeshed in
the resolution of this issue is the determination of the mechanism by which
this goal should be accomplished. What follows is a "prophec[y] of what
the courts will do in fact;" then, a "more pretentious" proposal for accom-
plishing the goal is offered. 3 Finally, a "most pretentious" argument is
made against this whole approach.
* B.S., Florida State University; J.D., University of Florida, Holland Law Center.
Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. Law Clerk for the Honorable James C.
Hill, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1977-1979.
The author thanks Robin Welch, candidate for the Juris Doctor degree at Texas Tech
University School of Law, for his research assistance. The cooperation of the judges of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is greatly appreciated. Of course, the
views expressed here are the author's alone.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41).
2. Id. § 10. The appellations used here are those of Congress.
3. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897). The predictive approach taken here is intended both to help attorneys and judges
perform in their respective roles and to aid the judges on the new courts in their "creative
effort in shaping the law," beyond Holmes's notion of day-to-day functioning. See Tushnet,
The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L.
REV. 975, 982 n.21 (1977).
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
II.
While the apex and the base of the three-tiered federal court system
have been relatively stable, the intermediate tier has been in a near con-
stant state of flux. The Reorganization Act is the latest in a long history of
significant institutional developments in the federal court system that will
be traced. In addition, the legislative division of the Fifth Circuit has its
own contextually significant history, which also will be summarized.
A.
Important historical developments in the intermediate federal court
mark major evolutionary stages of the federal court system.4
Article III of the Constitution settled the debate whether Congress could
establish a federal court system.5 The "transcendent achievement"6 of the
First Judiciary Act 7 has been considered to be the establishment of "the
tradition of a system of inferior federal courts."' 8 From the beginning, the
federal court system has had three tiers, with the federal district courts at
the base, the Supreme Court at the apex, and the circuit courts at the inter-
mediate level. Section 4 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 created the original
version of the middle tier, with three circuits encompassing the thirteen
district courts. 9 While the district courts were exclusively trial courts, the
circuit courts were empowered with both original and appellate jurisdic-
tion.' 0 The circuit courts' original jurisdiction included all matters not ex-
4. While an appreciation for the broad contours of federal judicial history is necessary
background for considering the issues raised here, a detailed survey is beyond the scope of
this Article. The classic history of the federal judiciary is F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(1927). Seegeneraly 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 56.14-.17, 56.48-.52 (rev.
ed. 1977); 1 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.1-.7 (2d ed. 1980); 13 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3501-3510 (1975); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLI-
TICS OF FEDERAL COURTS (1970); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948); Manton, Organization and Work of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, 12 A.B.A.J. 41 (1926); Surrency, A History of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REV. 214(I963).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 vests the federal judicial power "in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 9 gives Congress the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court." For an account of the judiciary in the colonies and under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, see H. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT (1977); R. POUND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 72-105 (1941); Frank, supra note 4, at 4-9; Swindler, Seedtime of
an American Judiciary.- From Independence to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503
(1976).
6. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 4.
7. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
8. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 4. The legislative history of the Act
is detailed in Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). For a detailed account of the formative period (1787-1801) under
the Act, see generally D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION (1971).
9. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74. Special provisions were made




clusively reserved for the district courts, I I which included the more serious
criminal offenses and, when the amount in controversy exceeded five hun-
dred dollars, diversity cases and cases in which the United States was a
party. 12 The circuit courts also had appellate jurisdiction to review deci-
sions of the district courts both in civil cases in which the amount of con-
troversy exceeded fifty dollars and in admiralty cases in which the amount
in controversy exceeded three hundred dollars. 13 Although vested with
some constitutionally ordained original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
was then the principal appellate court in the federal system, with jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from the circuit courts.' 4 The circuit courts were
therefore the principal federal trial court. 15
This three-tiered structure remains today, although the jurisdictional
content of each of the tiers has undergone significant change. At the apex,
the Supreme Court has seen minor changes in its jurisdiction, terms of
court, and number of Associate Justices. 16 At the base, the principal
change at the district court level has been a marked increase in members. 17
The most noteworthy functional developments in the federal court system,
however, have been the byproducts of institutional changes in the middle
tier.' 8 The Reorganization Act is merely the latest in a long line of such
developments, which mark the major evolutionary stages of the entire sys-
tem.
A congressional preoccupation with the middle tier has been part of the
federal court tradition. This preoccupation began almost at once, as the
circuit court was immediately considered the most "inferior" '19 of the three
levels. At this time, the circuit courts had no judges of their own; instead,
two Supreme Court Justices and a district court judge sat as a panel. 20
Members of the Supreme Court, the bar, and litigants were opposed to this
both in theory and in practice. Because of the harshness of travel, panels
often could not sit, which meant that both appellate and original cases had
11. The district court was granted exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases, minor crimi-
nal offenses, and a few other limited areas. Id. § 9.
12. Id.§ 11.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 13. The Supreme Court also could reexamine a case decided by the district
court and reviewed by the circuit court. Id. §§ 21-25. Even so, no appeal was provided for
in criminal cases and there were jurisdictional amounts required for an appeal to the
Supreme Court. Id.
15. While the jurisdiction of the district courts was increased from time to time, their
importance never rivalled that of the circuit courts. Surrency, supra note 4, at 216. See
generally Zobel, Those Honorable Courts-Early Days on the First First Circuit, 73 F.R.D.
511 (1977).
16. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 36. See generally id. at 35-45; F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4.
17. From the original 13 judges in 13 districts (Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1
Stat. 73), the number of districts has grown to 95, the most recently created being the District
Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1694-1694e (Supp. III 1979). The
Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 raised the total number of district judgeships to 507. 28
U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. III 1979); see text accompanying notes 107-19 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 61-69 infra.
19. "Inferior" is, of course, the Constitution's term. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
20. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74.
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to be postponed until the next term of court.21 Although a 1793 statute
lessened the travel burden for Supreme Court Justices by providing that
one Justice and the district court judge could sit as a circuit court, that Act
created the new problem of a divided bench.22
Motivated equally by political expediency and genuine concern for the
federal judicial system, Congress passed the famous, short-lived "Law of
the Midnight Judges" Act in 1801.23 Under the 1801 Act, special circuit
judges would be appointed to sit in panels of three in the six newly num-
bered circuits. Opponents' main criticism of the 1801 Act was political: it
nearly doubled the number of federal judges, and all of the new appointees
would be Federalists. 24 Reacting to this court packing and the judicial
attitudes of President Adams's appointees, 25 the new Jeffersonian Congress
passed another Judiciary Act in 1802.26 The 1802 Act essentially returned
the circuit court to its status under the First Judiciary Act, 27 with one Jus-
tice and one district court judge sitting on each of the six circuit courts.
The 1802 Act, however, authorized a single district judge to sit as a circuit
court. As the number of circuit court sittings increased to accommodate
more districts, circuit riding became "a duty of imperfect obligation" 28 be-
cause of the hardships involved and the Justices' personal resistance. The
significant reforms of the 1801 Act, abolishing circuit riding and creating
circuit court judgeships, were lost.29 Although a Justice need not sit on
each circuit court, under the 1802 scheme the creation of a new circuit
would require a new Associate Justice. The short-lived 1801 Act had pro-
vided the flexibility of creating circuit judgeships independently of the
21. D. HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 41-44; Surrency, supra note 4, at 217.
22. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333. The statute seemed to formalize what had
become the existing practice. The 1789 statute established a quorum of two, and most cir-
cuit courts sat with only one Supreme Court Justice. Surrency, supra note 4, at 219.
23. Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, supra note 4, at 21-30; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 36-37; Surrency, supra
note 4, at 219-21; Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 53 (1958);
Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1961).
24. Surrency, supra note 4, at 220.
25. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 27-28. The controversy gave rise to
the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156, as amended by Act of March 3, 1803, ch.
40, 2 Stat. 244. This repeal raised no small constitutional question. See F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 26-28 n.75. Despite the tenure granted to federal judges in U.S.
CONST. art. III, § I and art. II, § 4:
"A repeal was a [sic] promptly acceded to by the councils of the nation, and a
newly created host of judges stripped of their salaries, their offices, and their
honors, before time had been given them to enjoy, or even taste the delicious
flavor of the dainties which had been placed before them--to warm the seats
on which they had been placed, or to be warmed by the ermines with which
they had been enshrouded."
Surrency, supra note 4, at 220-21 (quoting 8 T. BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF
CONGRESS 160-61 (1850)). The opposition might not have been so intense, nor repeal so
swift and sure, had President Adams not sought to appoint all the newly authorized judges.
Surrency, supra note 4, at 220.
27. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
28. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 37.
29. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 32.
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number of Supreme Court Justices. The loss of this flexibility resulted in
nine decades "of near-unanimous recognition of the inadequacy of the ju-
dicial system, of interminable debate about remedies, and of long-delayed
and meager action."30
Western expansion brought new states into the Republic and increased
the demands on the federal court system. A seventh circuit was created for
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio in 1807. 3 1 This required a new Associate
Justice to preside in the new circuit. Because the number of Supreme
Court Justices was determined by the number of circuit courts, Congress
avoided change at the circuit court level for twenty years; new states sim-
ply were not brought into the circuit court system. By 1837 the nation's
needs had gone unremedied so long as to create compelling momentum.32
In that year, Congress increased the membership of the Supreme Court to
nine and redivided the country into nine circuits, 33 including eight states
that previously had been outside the circuit court system. 34
Unfortunately, the 1837 Act proved to be too little, too late. The "long
delayed plan for relief had become antiquated by events,"'35 as the circuit
system began to crumple under the pressing burden of increased Supreme
Court and circuit court caseloads.36 Debate and consideration of legisla-
tive proposals amending or abolishing the circuit court system began anew.
Three decades of ineffective congressional tinkering with the circuit courts
accomplished little, but increased the momentum for reform.37
As the Civil War approached, judicial reform was put aside, only to
emerge after the war as a vigorous aspect of the new postwar nationalism.
The seed of autonomy for the circuit courts, however, was planted before
the Civil War. In 1855 California became the new tenth circuit,38 to which
Oregon and Nevada were added in 1863. 39 Of more significance, between
1855 and 1863 a separate circuit judgeship was created; not until 1863 was
30. HART & WECHSLER, supralnote 4, at 37.
31. Act of February 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420, as amended by Act of March 22, 1808,
ch. 38, 2 Stat. 477, and Act of February 4, 1809, ch. 14, 2 Stat. 516.
32. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 36-50.
33. Act of March 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176.
34. Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, and Mis-
souri had been independent districts prior to this enactment. See Chronological Table, Ap-
pendix, infra.
35. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 49.
36. For a discussion of the hardships of circuit riding during this period, see id. at 49-50
n. 163; Surrency, supra note 4, at 221-23. But see Mosk, Recycling the Old Circuit System, 27
S.C. L. REV. 633 (1976).
37. In an attempt to cope with the Supreme Court's backlog, Congress frequently added
a month to the Court's term. See, e.g., Act of May 4, 1826, ch. 37, 4 Stat. 160; Act of June
17, 1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at
50-55. In 1842 the circuits were reorganized once again. The existing fifth circuit was ab-
sorbed into the fourth and sixth circuits, and Alabama and Louisiana were carved out of the
ninth circuit to form a reconstructed fifth circuit. Act of August 16, 1842, ch. 180, 5 Stat.
507. See Chronological Table, Appendix infra.
38. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631.
39. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794, as amended by Act of February 19, 1864,
ch. 11, 13 Stat. 4.
1981]
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a tenth circuit Justice added to the Supreme Court.40 This ad hoc treat-
ment for the tenth circuit would prove portentous.
In 1862 the states that had been admitted since the 1837 rearrangement
were assigned to circuits4' by enlarging the ten existing circuits rather than
by increasing the number of circuits and Justices.42 During the Civil War
circuit court sessions were not held in the southern states. Recognition of
the need for fundamental restructuring of the federal court system in-
creased during the period from 1865 to 1891, as did pressure to eliminate
the circuit duties of the Justices and establish an intermediate appellate
court to relieve the Supreme Court's burden.43 In 1866 Congress once
again rearranged the districts, this time forming nine circuits." In order to
prevent President Johnson from filling Supreme Court vacancies, the 1866
Act reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices to seven. 45 Although
the number of Justices was restored to nine only three years later,46 the
1866 Act was a second important statutory precedent for circuit court
automony47 because it revived to a limited extent the 1801 Federalist ap-
proach.48 In the 1866 Act Congress created one circuit judgeship for each
of the nine circuits and reduced Supreme Court Justice circuit riding to a
symbolic minimum of once every two years.
The period between 1870 and 1891 has been described aptly as "the na-
dir of federal judicial administration. '49 Geographical expansion, popula-
tion increase, and commercial development all contributed to a post-Civil
War increase in federal court litigation, which was compounded by con-
gressional extensions of jurisdiction. The federal judicial system, ill-
equipped to handle the pre-Civil War demands on its resources, nearly
ground to a halt during this post-war period, buried in work.
In 1875 Congress conferred federal question jurisdiction upon the fed-
eral courts, restricted only by the requirement for an amount in contro-
40. Id.
41. Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576.
42. The year after the general rearrangement, Indiana was shifted from the seventh
circuit to the eighth circuit. Act of January 28, 1863, ch. 13, 12 Stat. 637. For a Civil War
vintage account of the circuit courts, see generally A. CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE OR-
GANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 83-174
(4th ed. 1864).
43. See note 64 infra. The intense political, social, and economic forces at work during
this period are described in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 56-77.
44. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
45. The legislative branch distrusted the judiciary as well, going so far as to withdraw a
grant of jurisdiction over a pending Supreme Court appeal. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868). See generally Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the
Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973).
46. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. The number of Justices has remained at
nine until today, being challenged seriously only by President Roosevelt's celebrated court-
packing plan. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 41-45.
47. The 1855 California experience was the first statutory precedent. See text accompa-
nying notes 38-40 supra.
48. See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
49. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 39.
[Vol. 35
DIVIDED FIFTH CIRCUIT
versy.50 The immediate result was "a flood of litigation utterly beyond the
existing capacity of the courts to handle."' 51 Between 1870 and 1880 the
Supreme Court caseload nearly doubled, and by 1890 the Court had
nearly three times its 1870 caseload.52 The influx of Supreme Court cases
reflected the enormous increase in the number of cases heard in the circuit
courts and district courts.5 3 Ultimately it became apparent that the situa-
tion was unlikely to improve and that a drastic remedy was in order.54
A political stalemate, however, delayed congressional attempts to cope
with the federal courts' crisis. The House approach was to restrict federal
court jurisdiction in a manner consistent with southern and western con-
cern for curtailment of federal court power. The Senate, on the other
hand, sought to remedy the problem by adding to the capacity of the
courts.5 5 While this legislative stalemate developed, the intermediate tier
had become virtually ineffectual due to congressional tinkering and the
practical realities of the court system as it then was structured. By 1890 the
statutory duty of Justices to ride circuit had become "Pickwickian," 56 and
for the ten circuit judges to hold sittings in the sixty-five court districts was
equally impossible.5 7 Because the circuit court jurisdiction was partly ap-
pellate in nature, the absence of a circuit judge or a Justice left the district
judge alone to review a judgment the same judge had entered.58 Addition-
ally, Congress had enacted a patchwork of jurisdictional changes that re-
sulted in insulating from review the circuit court's original decisions in all
but the most serious cases. As a result, an appeal from a district court
50. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This expansion is discussed in F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 65.
51. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 39.
52. For the 1870 term the Supreme Court docket listed 636 cases. During the 1880
term, 1212 cases were docketed. The number of cases grew to 1816 by 1890. F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 60.
53. An 1873 backlog of 29,013 cases had swelled to 38,045 in 1880. By 1890 there were
54,194 such cases waiting to be heard. Id.
54. Efforts to stem the tide had negligible effect. For example, the repeal of the Bank-
ruptcy Act seemed to have no effect on the mounting case load. Id. Legislation that might
have eased the pressure on the circuit courts and district courts was offset by Congress's
creation of new federal jurisdiction. Compare Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552,
correctedby Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (minor restrictions on jurisdiction),
with Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (district courts given additional concurrent
jurisdiction over claims against the United States).
55. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 40. An account of the legislative maneuvering
during this period is provided in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 86-102.
56. Hill, The Federal Judicial System, 12 A.B.A. REP. 289, 302 (1889), quoted in F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 87 n. 140. Justices were required to sit on the
Supreme Court for nine months and to ride circuit the remainder of the year. Id.
57. A tenth circuit judge had been added in 1887 to sit in the second circuit. Act of
March 3, 1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492.
58. This development was incompatible with the philosophy of the federal courts. The
First Judiciary Act had adopted the notion of having an appellate judge sit on the reviewed
court, but specifically provided "no district judge shall give a vote in any case of appeal or
error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of such his decision." Act of Sep-
tember 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74. See D. HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 23 n. 11.
Contemporary opinion condemned this development as well: "Such an appeal is not from
Phillip drunk to Phillip sober, but from Phillip sober to Phillip intoxicated with the vanity of
a matured opinion and doubtless also a published decision." Hill, supra note 56, at 307.
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more likely than not would be wasted effort. Furthermore, in most circuit
court original proceedings the litigant was not even permitted to make the
attempt.5 9
At last, in the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, commonly known
as the Evarts Act, 60 Congress made a long overdue structural change in the
federal courts which, as before6' and since, 62 was performed on the middle
tier of the system. The Evarts Act was the first significant structural modi-
fication in the courts since the establishment of the federal judicial sys-
tem. 63 The Act retained much of the system's original structure while
providing meaningful relief for the over-burdened courts. The Act created
a circuit court of appeals for each circuit.64 The circuit court of appeals
was to be composed of an additional circuit judge, who would hear ap-
peals from the district courts and circuit courts together with the circuit
judge under the 1866 Act 65 and either the circuit Justice or a district judge.
The Act abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court, while re-
taining its original jurisdiction. The Act further decreed that a judge who
presided at the trial of a case could not hear the appeal.66 A second review
as of right by the Supreme Court was allowed in a variety of cases, subject
to an amount in controversy requirement. In the remaining cases, the cir-
cuit court of appeals decision was deemed final, and the Supreme Court
was authorized to grant review only by a writ of certiorari or by certified
question from the circuit court of appeals. The institutionalization of the
notion of discretionary review of some decisions of the circuit court of ap-
peals was an innovation that later would prove significant.
Like all legislation involving the structure of the courts, the Evarts Act
was subject to two limitations.67 First, the contemporary nature and activ-
ities of society determine the level of demand on the courts, not the inter-
nal court organization. Secondly, as is true of all legislation, statutes
affecting the courts often have consequences far beyond those foreseen by
Congress. While the drafters of the Evarts Act certainly were aware of
economic development within this country and abroad, they failed to an-
ticipate the corresponding growth of governmental regulation. 68 New re-
forms soon would be in order, but for the present, the immediate needs of
59. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 87-88.
60. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
61. See text accompanying notes 19-34 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 98-119 infra.
63. Had it survived, the short-lived Act of 1801 would have been of the same order of
magnitude. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
64. The narrow purpose of an intermediate court of appeal in a two-tiered appellate
system is usually to lessen the caseload pressures on the court of last resort. As caseloads at
all levels increase, the intermediate appellate court almost inevitably plays an ever-widening
role in the development of the law, serving as a de facto court of last resort in the majority of
cases. See generally Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 459 (1975). The federal appellate courts have followed this pattern. See Parker, The
Federal Judicial System, 14 F.R.D. 361, 363-65 (1953).
65. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
66. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
67. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 103.
68. See generally id. at 104-28.
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the country were met. Federal court dockets soon became more managea-
ble.69
By this time, however, any justification for retaining the circuit court
had disappeared. In theory, elaborate legal distinctions separated the dis-
trict court from the circuit court; in reality, the distinctions generated con-
fusion, waste, and abuses. 70 The attempt to save the circuit courts in 1869
by providing circuit judges failed due to the demands of caseload and ge-
ography. Under the 1869 Act the norm became a circuit court presided
over by a single district judge. Judicial reformers debated between propos-
als to create an intermediate appellate court and other proposals to abolish
the circuit court.71 These proposals were so interdependent that when
Congress accomplished the first in the Evarts Act, the adoption of the sec-
ond soon followed. The Evarts Act withdrew from the circuit courts their
appellate jurisdiction, which had become redundant with the creation of
the circuit courts of appeals. This development served only to highlight
the redundancy of the circuit court's original jurisdiction; with the advent
of a new appellate court, the "more weighty" nisiprius circuit court was a
"needless safeguard. ' 72 Finally, as part of "a systematic statement of the
structural principles defining the role of the federal courts in the American
constitutional scheme," 73 the circuit courts were abolished in 1911. The
circuit courts of appeals were renamed the courts of appeals for the various
circuits. 74 This development generally left the district court as the trial
court, the court of appeals as the intermediate appellate court, and the
Supreme Court as the federal system's court of last resort.
The federal court system has not evolved beyond the 1911 structure.75
In 1929 a Tenth Circuit was added to the nine created by the Evarts Act by
69. Id. at 108. For a description of the practical functioning of the federal courts under
the Evarts Act, see F. LOVELAND, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1911).
70. Often a presiding judge would open circuit court proceedings, call the docket, and
solemnly close court. The same judge would open district court proceedings immediately
thereafter, with the same clerk and other court officials in attendance. Breckons, The Judicial
Code of United States with Some Incidental Observations on its Application to Hawaii, 22
YALE L.J. 453, 457 (1913), quoted in F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 128 n.
107.
71. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 128-29.
72. Id. at 129. For a discussion of the lingering death of the circuit court between 1891
and 1911, see id. at 128-45.
73. Id. at 145. Postponed by being caught up in the codification effort, the abolition
itself raised some difficult problems that had to be overcome, such as the territorial authority
of judges. See generally id. at 134-35.
74. Act of March 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087.
75. Numerous major reforms in jurisdiction have occurred since 1911. For example,
the famous Judges Bill of 1925 effected a significant reform in Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Act of February 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. While not intended as a struc-
tural change, the creation of the position of United States magistrate gradually may be de-
veloping into a systemic alteration of constitutional dimension. Act of October 17, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108. See generaly Peterson, The Federal Magistrates Act: A
New Dimension in the Implementation of Justice, 56 IowA L. REV. 62 (1970); Comment, The
Federal Magistrates Act-An Exercise in Article III Constitutionality, 17 WAYNE L. REV.
1483 (1971). Many provocative structural reorganizations of the federal courts recently have
been proposed. See note 77 infra.
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detaching six states from the Eighth Circuit.76 The structural changes in
the system between 1789 and 1911 demonstrate the congressional preoccu-
pation with imposing middle-tier structural changes while maintaining the
stable apex and base. A chronological table charting this preoccupation is
set out in the Appendix to this Article.
B.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 is the
latest example of the congressional preoccupation with altering the middle
tier of the federal courts. Congress recently has been concerned specifi-
cally with the unique problems of the large circuits, those that have exper-
ienced such enormous docket growth that their effective functioning has
been endangered. The history of the upcoming division provides further
background for understanding its significance.
The Fifth Circuit's surfeited docket has been the subject of long and
detailed study.77 The Judicial Conference of the United States was in-
formed in 1963 that its committees on court administration and judicial
statistics had agreed on the need for additional judges in the Fifth Circuit,
but had disagreed as to the best way in which to accomplish the increase in
judgepower. 78 The Conference formed an ad hoc committee to study the
geographical organization of the federal courts. In its 1964 report the ad
hoc committee recommended a division of the Fifth Circuit into a new
fifth circuit composed of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi and
a new eleventh circuit composed of Louisiana, Texas, and the Canal
Zone.79 In that year the Judicial Conference initiated a policy of making
comprehensive surveys of the business of the circuits and districts every
76. Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45 Stat. 1346. See text accompanying
notes 289-96 infra.
77. The Fifth Circuit leads any discussion of overcrowded dockets of the courts of ap-
peals. As early as 1950, one commentator noted the rising caseload of the Fifth Circuit and
suggested splitting it into a new eleventh circuit composed of Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and a new fifth circuit composed of the Canal Zone,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Wahl, The Casefor an Eleventh Court o/Appeals, 24
FLA. L.J. 233 (1950). For other early commentary with suggested solutions for congested
dockets, see generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Haworth,
Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 257; Wiener, Federal Regional Courts.- Solution for the Certiorari Dilemma, 49
A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: 4 Crisis in JudicialAdministra-
tion, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 949 (1964). For a novel suggestion for relieving the courts of ap-
peals, see Lay, A Proposalfor Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J.
1151 (1981). For a comparative analysis of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia
Circuits, see J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1981).
78. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 184, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1963).
79. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
14-15 (1964). The report prompted Professor Charles Alan Wright to observe that "[tihe
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is at a point of crisis." Wright, supra
note 77, at 949. In May 1964 then Chief Justice Warren addressed the American Law Insti-
tute and urged the passage of corrective legislation. Address by Chief Justice Warren,
American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 20, 1964), quoted in Morgan, The Ffth Cir-
cuit: Expand or Divide, 29 MERCER L. REV. 885, 886 (1978).
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four years. As a result of the 1964 survey and the resulting recommenda-
tions, Congress added four temporary judges to the Fifth Circuit in 1966,
raising the total number of judges on the court to thirteen. 80 The tempo-
rary judgeships were made permanent and two others were added in
196881 to "alleviate . . . a crisis situation"; Congress was convinced that
the action was necessary and could not await the scheduled 1968 survey. 82
As serious as the problem had been when originally noted, it only wors-
ened as study and debate lengthened. The parade of horrible statistics
lengthened with each new appraisal of the situation.83 Between 1950 and
the mid-1960s, appellate filings in the Fifth Circuit had more than
doubled.84 By the middle 1970s the total was roughly eight times the 1950
level.8 5 Congress simply could not add judges fast enough to keep the
court afloat.
In 1970 Chief Justice Warren Burger urged that Congress create a com-
mission to study and reexamine the structure of the federal court system. 86
The Judicial Conference of the United States made a similar recommenda-
tion in the same year. 87 Responding to the collective urging of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, the Ameri-
can Bar Association, and the chief judges of all eleven circuits, Congress
created the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate Sys-
tem in 1972.88 The Commission was charged with conducting a broad
80. The President was authorized to appoint four judges immediately, with the limita-
tion that the next four vacancies on the court would go unfilled. Act of March 18, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-372, 80 Stat. 75. See generally S. REP. No. 782, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2086. The previous increase had occurred in 1961.
Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80. See generally H.R. REP. No. 215, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1729; CONF. REP. No.
342, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1743.
The docket increase between 1954 and 1961 made it clear that seven years was too long to
wait between evaluations. See Act of February 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-294, 68 Stat. 8.
81. Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, 82 Stat. 184.
82. S. REP. No. 782, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2086, 2087. The court had been operating with the equivalent of 15 judges by arrang-
ing for visiting judges to sit. Thus the 1968 legislation did not decrease the Fifth Circuit's
caseload per judge, which was then the highest among the courts of appeals. Id. at 2089.
83. Reports and statistical summaries abound. See, e.g., notes 77,-80 supra and notes
84, 140 infra.
84. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit- Or, How Not to Deal with a
Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 799 (1978).
85. Id. Judge Gee is careful to point out, however, that the workload did not increase
eight times in the 25-year period. Id.
86. Chief Justice Burger repeatedly has urged Congress to grant meaningful relief to the
federal courts. See, e.g., Burger, 1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A.J.
504 (1977).
87. S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3569, 3601.
88. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See generally CONF. REP.
No. 92-1457, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3611.
The Senate Report described the caseload explosion and listed some alternative solutions,
which included creating more circuit judgeships, dividing circuits, realigning the boundaries
of all the circuits, abolishing all circuit boundaries, and creating substantive law divisions in
large circuits. S. REP. No. 92-930, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3602, 3605-06. Congress was convinced that a real crisis could be avoided until
1975, which would give the Commission time to operate. Id. at 3610. See generally Hearings
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study of the federal judicial system's geographical divisions, structure, and
internal procedures and with recommending such changes as would be
"most appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial
business."' 89
The Commission conducted extensive hearings9" and filed its report on
the geographical realignment of the circuits in December 1973. Rather
than suggesting a complete realignment of the circuits, the Commission
recommended that the Fifth Circuit be divided so that Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia would be grouped in one circuit and Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas in another. This recommendation satisfied the Commission's
self-imposed criteria: (1) circuits should be composed of at least three
states; (2) no circuit should be created that would immediately require
more than nine judges; (3) a circuit should contain states with a diversity
of population, legal business, and socioeconomic interests; (4) realignment
should avoid excessive interference in established circuit alignment; and
(5) no circuit should contain noncontiguous states.91 The Commission
also proposed two alternatives: (1) an alignment of Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, and Mississippi and a second alignment of Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Texas; and (2) an alignment of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mis-
sissippi and a second alignment of Louisiana and Texas.92
The Fifth Circuit was the obvious starting place for the proposed re-
alignment and reform.93 Its problems with size and caseload were largest,
Before Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on HR. No. 7378, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); Levin & Fickler, Realignment of the Fft4h Circuit.- 4 Necessary First Step, 46
Miss. L.J. 659 (1975).
89. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. In the view of some of
those in the best position to know, the Commission was "foredoomed to fail" because it
could not consider jurisdictional reforms. Gee, supra note 84, at 803; Wisdom, Requiemfor a
Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REV. 787 (1980). See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); Sarat, The Role of Courts and the Logic of Court Reform."
Notes on the Justice Department's Approach to Improving Justice, 64 JUD. 300 (1981).
90. See generally COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYS-
TEM, HEARINGS (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 COMMISSION HEARINGS].
91. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits.- Recommendationsfor Change, 62 F.R.D. 223
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission on Revision]. The Commission recognized that the
boundaries were "largely the result of historical accident," but declined to recommend na-
tionwide reorganization because of its unsettling effects. Id. at 228. The Commission also
recommended the division of the Ninth Circuit, a proposal beyond the scope of this Article.
See generally Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974). The Commission later issued a second report. Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures- Rec-
ommendationsfor Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). This second report suggested a need for a
new National Court of Appeals, an idea proposed three years earlier by the so-called Freund
Committee under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center. Report of the Study Group on
the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).
92. Commission on Revision, supra note 91, at 233-34.
93. The Commission "harbor[ed] no illusions that realignment [was] a sufficient rem-
edy, adequate even for a generation, to deal with the fundamental problems now con-
fronting the Courts of Appeals." Id. at 229. Realigning the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,




and attempts to alleviate them by appointing more judges 94 and instituting
controversial procedural innovations95 already had been tried. Although
its judges were unanimously opposed to adding more judgeships, they had
voted overwhelmingly in favor of a split. 96 The inevitability of a backlog
was being suggested. 97 The Senate reacted with the introduction of three
bills, each tracking one of the three alternatives offered by the Commis-
sion.98 The Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the three bills and
received the comments and criticisms of lawyers and judges. The Subcom-
mittee's 1974 draft report proposed an internal reorganization of the Fifth
Circuit into two divisions, however, instead of the circuit split approach
taken by the Commission and adopted in the three bills.99
This so-called internal division approach to the reorganization of the
Fifth Circuit was translated into a Senate bill on which hearings were held
in 1975.100 The substituted bill called for internally reorganizing the Fifth
Circuit into two divisions: the Eastern Division, with twelve judges, would
have included Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Canal Zone; the West-
ern Division, with eleven judges, would have included Louisiana and
Texas.' 0 l The two divisions would have had similar caseloads. Each
94. See notes 80-82 supra.
95. See generally Rahdert & Roth, Inside the Ffth Circuit- Looking at Some of its Inter-
nal Procedures, 23 Lov. L. REV. 661 (1977); Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21
in the Fifh Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195
(1980). By the mid-1970s, the Fifth Circuit was deciding approximately 55% of its cases
without oral argument. See Rahdert & Roth at 668. See also 5TH CIR. R. 18. It also was
disposing of approximately 35% of its cases without a written opinion. See Schuchman &
Gelfand, at 220. See also 5TH CIR. R. 21.
96. Despite dramatic increases in caseload, the judges of the Fifth Circuit adopted a
resolution in October 1971 against adding judgeships. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS 81-82(1971). Instead, they favored a split.
See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 20-24; Levin & Fickler, supra note 88, at 667-73;
Written Joint Statement of Judges Gewin, Morgan, Clark, Coleman, Godbold Dyer, Simpson
and Bell, 1973 COMMISSION HEARINGS, supra note 90, at 392-95.
97. Hearings on S 729 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975).
98. See S. 2988-2990, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
99. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 40. Internal reorganization of the circuit into
divisions arose as a response to objections to splitting the Fifth Circuit, including a concern
over which new circuit would be called the Fifth. Splitting goes against the long-standing
tradition of the circuit. See note 91 supra. Confused resistance had been expressed for
grouping Mississippi with the civil law state of Louisiana and with Texas. Another fear was
the creation of an oil and gas law circuit, with Louisiana and Texas dominating one circuit.
See Gee, supra note 84, at 803-06. The splitting approach also involved the unique
problems of the Ninth Circuit, and the problems of dividing one state, California, between
two circuits. That proposal died quickly. See Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New" Na-
tional Court ofAppeals. Can the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 847 (1976); note 90 supra.
No bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee of either house in 1973 because the events
of Watergate preempted committee activities. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 8.
100. S. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generally Haworth, supra note 99, at 843-
54; Levin & Fickler, supra note 88. Because of strong resistance to dividing the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the State of California, the bill reported favorably by the Committee in December
1975 applied only to the Fifth Circuit. S. 2752, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See S. REP. No.
513, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 15 (1975).
101. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 41. The court had supported division into two
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would have had its own chief judge, clerk, circuit executive, and judicial
council. The substituted bill supposed some limited continued unity for
the new divisions, including a special joint en banc hearing before the most
senior judges of the two divisions to settle interpretive conflicts in the deci-
sions of the two divisions, a provision for a single judicial conference, and
interdivision assignment of district and circuit judges to accommodate
caseload demands. 0 2 Still, the net effect of the substituted bill was to cre-
ate two new circuit courts. The substituted bill' 0 3 thus departed from the
Commission's recommended proposal in two significant particulars. First,
it adopted the Commission's second alternative grouping, with Mississippi
aligned with Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 1°4 More importantly, the
substituted bill created divisions within the Fifth Circuit in lieu of two
new, completely autonomous circuits.105 Despite the pressing need for re-
lief, political inaction in the 94th Congress brought the matter to an anti-
climactic close. 106
Both the House and the Senate in the 94th Congress took up bills re-
aligning the Fifth Circuit. Because each chamber passed a different ver-
sion, both of which substantially increased the numbers of district and
circuit judgeships in the Fifth Circuit and throughout the country, the bills
were forced to go to a conference committee.' 0 7 Under the Senate version
the Fifth Circuit would be divided into two separate circuits. The fourteen
autonomous circuits by a vote of ten to three. Two judgeships were vacant. The judges also
requested that twelve additional judgeships be authorized and divided ratably between the
two new circuits. Id.
102. The special en banc was to be used in the event of a "conflict with a decision by the
other division of that circuit and affecting the validity, construction, or application of any
statute or administrative order, rule, or regulation, State or Federal, which affects personal
or property rights in the same State." S. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
103. S. 2752, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Fifth Circuit Divisions), substitutedfor S. 729,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Fifth and Ninth Circuit Divisions), substitutedfor S. 2988-2990,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Commission recommended splitting of Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits). See notes 83-85 supra.
104. The Commission had propounded even the alternatives as "a significant improve-
ment over the current situation." Commission on Revision, supra note 91, at 233.
105. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra. While recommending legislation to di-
vide the Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice suggested that the divisions were really two
autonomous circuits and should be designated as such so that all ties between the two would
be broken. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 42. The Louisiana Bar Association also sup-
ported creation of two new circuits of three states each. Id.
106. Some concern was raised that realignment might affect the conservative or liberal
tendencies of the court on certain legal issues, specifically civil rights. The Senate Judiciary
Committee found no factual basis for such concern. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 87, at 46
(citing Haworth, supra note 99). See generally Haworth, supra note 99, at 847-54. Partisan
politics may have played a role. Congress in 1975 was dominated by Democrats; the White
House was Republican, and a presidential election was imminent. While legislation affect-
ing the judicial structure is often nonpartisan, the prospect of wholesale judicial appoint-
ments generates intense political interest. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at
42.
After the 94th Congress adjourned, judicial statistics for 1976 became available and
showed still another increase in case filings. In addition, the Judicial Conference made its
quadrennial survey of judgeships and recommended that more be created. S. REP. No. 117,
supra note 87, at 8. Various other bills to add judges died during the same session. Id.
107. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 11, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
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judges of the new fifth circuit would hold court for Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone, and the twelve judges of the
new eleventh circuit would do the same for Louisiana and Texas.108 The
House bill would have increased the number of judges in the circuit, but
did not provide for splitting the Fifth Circuit.'0 9
Once the conference committee began work on the House and Senate
bills, profound disagreement immediately became apparent. 10 The Sen-
ate plan would have violated the Commission's criteria by isolating two
states in a single circuit and creating two new circuits with more than nine
judges."'I Civil rights proponents were concerned that the proposed new
fifth circuit would be composed only of more conservative, deep south
judges." 12 Concern also was raised that the proposed new eleventh circuit
would become an oil and gas circuit." 13
The conference committee labored long and hard over a compromise. A
plan was offered to appoint the additional judges and wait one year after
the appointment of the last judge for reports from the court and the Judi-
cial Conference. 1"4 Another compromise, offered to disarm the civil rights
objection, was to create a special forum to decide conflicts between the two
new circuits. The special forum was to be composed of the seventeen most
senior active judges, nine from the present court, four from the proposed
new fifth circuit, and four from the proposed new eleventh circuit." 5 In
the closing hours of the 95th Congress, a compromise finally was reached
that allowed both sides to claim victory. " 6 In addition to creating the new
judgeships," 7 section 6 of the statute provided:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may consti-
tute itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and
108. S. 11, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). For a dialogue by two Fifth Circuit judges on the
merits of S. 11, see Gee, supra note 84, and Morgan, supra note 79.
109. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H. CONF. REP. No. 1643, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3618, 3618.
110. For an account of some of the compromise efforts, see 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1416
(June 3, 1978); 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1854 (July 22, 1978); 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579 (Sept. 23,
1978); 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2960 (Oct. 14, 1978). See generally Reavley, The Split ofthe Ffth
Circuit.- Update and Finis, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1981).
11l. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
112. See note 106 supra; 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579 (Sept. 23, 1978). For a history of the
Fifth Circuit's tradition of courage and its leadership role during the Civil Rights era, see
generally F. READ & L. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION
OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978); Read, The Bloodless Revolution.- The Role of the Ffth Circuit in
the Integration of the Deep South, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1149 (1981). See also Fraenkel, The
Function of the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties, 13 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 132 (1948).
113. See Reavley, supra note 110, at 3-4.
114. 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1416, 1417-18 (June 3, 1978).
115. 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1854 (July 22, 1978).
116. One Senate aide was quoted as sayig, "It was a real cop-out by both the House and
Senate conferees to get the judgeships and the political patronage. . . . They can interpret
it to mean anything they want." 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579 (Sept. 23, 1978) (omissions in
original). Congressman McClory, a member of the conference committee, labeled § 6 "in-
tentionally ambiguous language." 124 CONG. REC. H 11,471-472 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978).
117. A total of 152 district and circuit judgeships were created, the largest number ever
established by a single act of Congress. 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2961 (Oct. 14, 1978).
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staff as may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, and may perform its en banc function by such number
of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the
court of appeals."i8
In essence, the committee thus had left initial resolution of the issue to the
court itself."19
The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council promptly appointed an ad hoc com-
mittee to consider this section of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 and
the prospects of internal reorganization into administrative units and revi-
sion of the en banc procedure. 120 The court's committee heard the views
of each judge on both issues.' 21 In June 1979 the Fifth Circuit Judicial
Council tabled the matter until more than sixteen active judges were in
place, and it was set for consideration at the September 1979 session.' 22 At
that session, twenty-two active judges debated the issues, and "it became
obvious that there were many differences of opinion about what should be
done."' 123 The majority agreed that the court could not split itself by rule
after Congress had rejected the split legislation.' 24 Because Congress
chose to maintain the Fifth Circuit as one court, it would be governed by
one rule of law.' 25 As the judges themselves would soon conclude, the
congressional decision to maintain one law of the circuit was sound in the-
ory, 126 but so burdensome as to be practically impossible without a divi-
sion of the circuit.
Continuation of the en banc function after the internal reorganization of
the circuit into administrative units threatened to endanger the notion of
one law of the circuit. Several proposals were considered to alleviate the
118. Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. 11 1978)). Only the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits satisfied the 15-judge
requirement. The Ninth Circuit adopted an administrative unit plan, dividing itself into
three units on Dec. 10, 1979. After circulating the proposal to interested members of the
Ninth Circuit bar, the court also adopted a plan for a modified en banc court consisting of
the Chief Judge and ten additional judges to be drawn by lot. Letter from Chief Judge
James R. Browning, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (May 9, 1980). See 9TH
CIR. R. 23, 25. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976) (if no Supreme Court quorum exists, case is
remitted to the court of appeals of origin for final resolution by either the en banc court or a
court constituted of the three most senior judges). See generally THE THIRD BRANCH, May
1981, at 1 (interview with Chief Judge Browning).
119. The committee requested reports from the judicial council of the court and the Judi-
cial Conference one year after the appointment of the last judge on "what rules have been
implemented . . . how those rules are working, and recommendations for such additional
legislation as may be necessary to provide for the effective and expeditious administration
and disposition of the business of that court." H. CONF. REP. No. 1643, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1978).




124. The Judicial Conference apparently drew support for this conclusion from Con-
gress's use in § 6 of the term "administrative units" rather than "judicial units." Id. See
Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. 11 1978).
125. See 124 CONG. REC. S17,515-17 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy);
124 CONG. REC. HI 1,473-74 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
126. See note 134 infra.
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difficulties presented. One suggestion was that each administrative unit,
east and west, have its own en banc court, but this approach raised the
problems of whether one en banc court would bind the other and how to
resolve conflicts between the two en banc courts. One solution would have
created a "grande en banc" from the entire circuit to resolve such con-
flicts.' 27 This proposal ultimately was deemed unacceptable because it
would have added another year to the appellate process and would have
postponed, not solved, the original problems of a twenty-six-member
court. 1
28
Because an en banc court of twenty-six judges was deemed a problem in
itself, several proposals suggested the creation of a permanent en banc
court of a smaller number, selected either by lot or by seniority. 29 This
proposal was rejected because it would impair the court's collegiality by
establishing classes of judges and would deny nonparticipating judges an
important judicial function. 30 Another proposal, which would have pro-
vided for random selection of the en banc court for each sitting, failed
because a fortuitous selection process could reduce en banc precedent to
the "luck of the draw."' 3' Such a result would have had serious conse-
quences for the rule of one law for the circuit.
This commitment to maintaining one rule of law in the circuit left few
alternatives, and no court consensus could be reached. The September
1979 Judicial Council decided to postpone action under section 6 for one
year,' 32 but the court soon became impatient with its self-imposed morato-
rium and reconsidered section 6 at its May 1980 Judicial Council. 133 For
the first time, the Council voted unanimously to petition Congress and re-
quest the creation of two autonomous circuits.' 34 The Judicial Council
also arranged the court into two administrative units: Unit A, composed
of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and Unit B, composed of Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia. 35 The unity of the en banc court, the judicial con-
ference, and the judicial council were maintained.
The unanimous May 5, 1980, petition from the Judicial Council trig-
gered a quick congressional response. Senate Bill 2830, which would have
127. Reavley, supra note 110, at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 5-6.
130. The suggestion was made that such a permanent solution would deprive the non-
participating judges of their judicial office unconstitutionally without House impeachment
and Senate removal. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
131. Reavley, supra note 110, at 6.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id.
134. The collective sense of the gathering was that this was the only solution. Telephone
interview with Chief Judge J.P. Coleman, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
(May 14, 1980).
135. A committee was appointed to smooth the transition. Id.; see 5TH CIR. R. I. Judges
of each unit generally were to sit together in panels for that unit, "although the authority of
judges to act as members of this Court throughout this circuit shall in no way be dimin-
ished." Id.
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split the Fifth Circuit, passed the Senate on June 18, 1980.136 House Bill
7665, which ultimately was enacted, created the new Fifth Circuit, com-
posed of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and the new
Eleventh Circuit, composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 37 Testi-
mony at the committee hearings, held in August 1980, unanimously fa-
vored the proposals. 38
The House Report described several reasons for splitting the Fifth Cir-
cuit. 139 The committee cited the court's enormity in geography, in popula-
tion, in docket, and in judgeships as diseconomies of scale. 140 Ironically,
the congressional solution of 1978,141 adding judges, had become the pre-
136. S. 2830, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
137. H.R. 7665, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), was introduced on June 25, 1980. The only
difference between H.R. 7665 and S. 2830 was that the Senate version placed the Canal Zone
in the new Eleventh Circuit. Both versions divided the states as requested in the Judicial
Conference's petition.
138. The following organizations supported the judges' unanimous petition for splitting
the court: U.S. Department of Justice; American Bar Association; Commission on Revision
of the Federal Court Appellate System; Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit; Federal Bar
Association; National Association of Attorneys General; Attorneys General of the six states
within the Fifth Circuit; Delegates from the State of Georgia to the Fifth Circuit Judicial
Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of Alabama to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence, 1980; Delegates from the State of Texas to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980;
Delegates from the State of Florida to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates
from the State of Louisiana to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from
the State of Mississippi to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; United States Magis-
trates of the Fifth Circuit; District Judges' Association of the Fifth Circuit (consisting of 110
district judges); Bankruptcy Judges of the Fifth Circuit; Mississippi Bar Association; Florida
Bar Board of Governors; State Bar of Georgia; Houston, Texas, Bar Association; Mobile,
Alabama, Bar Association; New York Times; and Alabama Black Lawyers Association.
Several influential groups withdrew their prior opposition: American Civil Liberties
Union; Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Alabama Black Lawyers Associa-
tion; and NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
The expressed concern of civil rights supporters for the perpetuation of an all-white judi-
ciary in the south was recognized. The committee, however, deemed the fear overcome by
affirmative action guidelines in judicial selection. H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
4-5, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4236, 4239-40. See generally Hearing
Be ore the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 6060, HR. 7665, and Related Bills, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on HR. 7665].
139. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138.
140. Id. at 2-4. The geographical size of the six states in the Fifth Circuit has not
changed since 1891, when it became one of the original circuits. Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
587, 26 Stat. 826. See text accompanying notes 61-66 supra. Indeed, modern means of
transportation have made riding circuit much less onerous than in the past, albeit much
more expensive. See text accompanying notes 17-30 supra. Total population in the area
covered by the Fifth Circuit now approaches 40 million. The future docket predictions were
staggering. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 2. With the addition of 35 district court
judges in the Omnibus Judgeship Bill of 1978, Fifth Circuit filings would have reached 5,380
by 1982. Even with the split, the dockets of each of the two new circuits will be larger than
any other circuit except the Ninth: in 1980 the states of the new Fifth Circuit had 2,301
filings and the states of the new Eleventh Circuit had 1,919. Fourteen judges will sit in the
new Fifth Circuit; twelve judges will sit in the new Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 4 n.9. The
committee's principal emphasis was the near impossibility of so many judges functioning as
an en banc court, maintaining uniformity in the law of the circuit, and coping effectively
with the burgeoning output of so large a court. Id. at 3.
141. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see text accompanying notes 103-19 supra.
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cipitous problem in 1980. Emphasizing the need for "uniformity in the
application of the law by the Court,"' 142 the committee concluded that
more intracircuit conflicts were inevitable with so many multiples of
panels. The en banc process, which otherwise would remedy internal con-
flicts, had become so difficult, time consuming, and cumbersome that its
effectiveness had suffered. 143 Thus, because Congress could not agree
upon a solution to the circuit's problems, it had delegated the problem to
the court, 44 which itself could not agree upon a unified approach; 145 and
the resulting judicial impasse at last precipitated congressional action. 146
III.
Consistent with long tradition, traced above, the Congress has continued
its preoccupation with the middle tier of the federal judiciary. 147 The Fifth
Circuit Reorganization Act of 1980 becomes effective on October 1,
1981.148 After three decades of debate and study, the Fifth Circuit will be
split,' 49 leaving three courts where there had been only one. Eventually,
two courts will survive: the new Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh Cir-
cuit. Further splitting in other circuits, possibly even in the new Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, ultimately may occur. This milestone in restructuring
the federal courts raises some intriguing questions of stare decisis, and in
that sense this split will be an experiment. The course of future congres-
sional restructuring of the federal court system may depend upon how well
the new courts adapt. The following portion of this Article discusses the
role of precedent in the new courts, particularly the viability of former
Fifth Circuit precedent in the new Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh Cir-
cuit.
A.
The definitional section of the Reorganization Act frames the central
inquiry. On the effective date of the Act, three courts will coexist within
the confines of the present Fifth Circuit. ' 50 First, the "former fifth circuit,"
defined as "the fifth judicial circuit of the United States as in existence on
142. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 3.
143. Id.; see note 273 infra.
144. See text accompanying notes 103-19 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 120-35 supra.
146. Congress has not acted with regard to the Ninth Circuit's willingness to modify its
en banc function. See note 118 supra.
147. See generally Part II, section A supra.
148. Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 12, 94 Stat. 1994, 1996 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reorganiza-
tion Act].
149. See generally Part II, section B supra.
150. For a codification of the current geographical division of the circuit courts of ap-
peals, see 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). Since the courts of appeals were created in 1891, the Fifth
Circuit has been comprised of the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, and Texas. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 587, 26 Stat. 826. See text accompanying notes
61-66 supra. These six states have been grouped together since 1866 when the circuit courts
were reorganized. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209. See text accompanying notes
44-47 supra and Appendix infra.
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the day before the effective date," 151 will continue to exist in two situa-
tions. If the matter has been submitted for decision before the effective
date of the Act, 152 or if a petition is made for rehearing or for rehearing en
banc in a matter decided or submitted before the effective date, 153 the mat-
ter will be processed as if the Act had not been enacted.' 54 The "former
fifth circuit" will cease to exist on July 1, 1984.155 If the matter has not
been submitted according to these procedures, the Act provides that the
former Fifth Circuit shall transfer the appeal or proceeding, along with all
supporting documents, to the appropriate new court for complete adjudi-
cation, as if it had been filed after the effective date. 156 Secondly, the Act
creates the "new fifth circuit," defined as the fifth judicial circuit estab-
lished by amending its composition to include the District of the Canal
Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 157 Thirdly, the Act establishes
the "eleventh circuit," defined as the "newly created"' 158 eleventh judicial
circuit composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 159 Thus, at least for a
short time and for limited purposes, the former court will continue, to be
joined and ultimately replaced by two new courts. 160
This triennial' 6' triptych of tribunals raises three questions of stare deci-
sis. First, will the precedents of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the
151. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 10(I).
152. Id. § 9(I). "Submitted" includes cases in which "oral argument has been heard or
... the case has otherwise been submitted to a panel for decision." H.R. REP. No. 1390,
supra note 138, at 8. This distinction logically would apply when the record and briefs in a
case have been sent to a screening panel. See generally Rahdert & Roth, supra note 95, at
666-75. The procedure would, of course, include the Administrative Units Plan adopted by
the court, which corresponds to the division of two new circuits. 5TH CIR. R. 1. See text
accompanying notes 134-35 supra. It is assumed that the procedure would include all cases
decided by and remanded to a panel of the former Fifth Circuit.
153. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 9(3). This subsection preserves all rights to
petitions for rehearing in matters decided or submitted before the effective date. H.R. REP.
No. 1390, supra note 138, at 8. It is assumed that this authority would include cases decided
by and remanded to the former Fifth Circuit en banc court from the Supreme Court.
154. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, §§ 9(1), (3); H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note
138, at 8.
155. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 11. The transition period also allows the for-
mer Fifth Circuit broad administrative discretion to resolve unforeseen developments. H.R.
REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 9.
156. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 9(2). The new circuits thus will begin with an
existing docket. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 8.
157. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 10(2). This is "the Fifth Circuit created" by
the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 9 (emphasis added).
158. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 10(2).
159. Id. § 10(3).
160. Additionally, the Reorganization Act: (1) specifies the number of active judges for
each new circuit (14 for the new Fifth Circuit and 12 for the new Eleventh Circuit) (id. § 3);
(2) specifies one city in each state for holding court in each new circuit (id. § 4); (3) assigns
the regular active judges to the respective new circuits (id. § 5); (4) provides senior judges
with an option to be assigned to either new circuit (id. § 6); (5) specifies the seniority of the
judges within each new circuit (id. § 7); and (6) authorizes the new Eleventh Circuit to hold
court in the New Orleans courthouse until its own new quarters in Atlanta are complete (id.
§ 8). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 6-9.
161. The three courts will coexist for three years. The effective date of the Reorganiza-
tion Act is October 1, 1981. The former Fifth Circuit will cease to exist July 1, 1984. Reor-
ganization Act, supra note 148, §§ 11-12.
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Act's effective date be binding on the limited version of the Fifth Circuit
that temporarily survives the split? Secondly, will the precedents of the
former Fifth Circuit be binding on the new Fifth Circuit? Finally, will the
precedents of the former Fifth Circuit be binding on the new Eleventh
Circuit?
Venturing here "a prophec[y] of what the court will do in fact, and noth-
ing more pretentious,"' 62 the three courts apparently will answer each
question in the affirmative, although like any prophecy, this one is not
altogether certain. Former Chief Judge Brown, an opponent of the split
before the effects of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 were felt, 163 con-
sidered these "most urgent question[s]."1 64 He saw the "uncertainty" 65 of
their resolution as raising "significant problems for future efforts to view
the Fifth Circuit's opinions on an institutional basis."' 166 To some com-
mentators, however, former Fifth Circuit precedent clearly would bind all
three new courts. 167 Two members of the former court, who will sit on
opposite sides of the great divide, have stated publicly that there will be
only affirmative answers to the three questions regarding the use of prece-
dent. Notably, the assurances of Chief Judge Godbold'68 and Judge
162. See note 3 supra.
163. See generally notes 120-35 supra.
164. Brown, Revision by Division?, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 319, 320 (1975).
[T]he division proposal leaves other questions unanswered. The most ur-
gent question to consider is what the precedential value of past and present
Fifth Circuit decisions will be in the event the division proposal passes. Is it
osSible, for instance, for each division to denounce the Fifth Circuit law and
begin afresh with "Division" law?
[Wlith enactment of the division scheme, skeptical students, teachers, and
authors will have to reckon with (1) the old Fifth Circuit law, (2) the current
law of the Western, (3) the current law of the Eastern, and (4) the probable
new law of each.
Id. The subject of discussion was the ill-fated Senate Bill 11. See text accompanying notes
107-09 supra.
165. Brown, The Great Divide, 21 Loy. L. REV. 509, 510 (1975): "There remains the
uncertainty as to the precedential value of past and present Fifth Circuit decisions as applied
to the divided Fifth Circuit . . . . [D]igestion and analysis will have to pay considerable
attention to the sources of the various decisions: Old Fifth Circuit, Western Division, East-
ern Division, or all three." Id. Again, the subject of discussion was Senate Bill 11. See text
accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
166. Brown, The Fifth Circuit.- To Be or Not To Be?, 20 Loy. L. REV. 415, 417 (1974):
This split could raise significant problems for future efforts to view the Fifth
Circuit's opinions on an institutional basis. What happens if the circuit is di-
vided? How is it to be divided? If it is divided, what happens to the presently
accepted institutional judicial determinations? Does each circuit start out
afresh? To what extent are the decisions [of the former Fifth Circuit] to be
binding on the new circuits? Are they to be binding only upon the circuit
which happens to be renamed the "Fifth"? Or are they to be binding also on
the one chosen to be the "Eleventh"?
Id. The subject of this discussion was the split recommended by the Commission on Revi-
sion of the Federal Court Appellate System of the United States. See text accompanying
notes 88-92 supra.
167. See Rahdert & Roth, supra note 95, at 661 ("All case law decided before the split
will be binding upon each [new] circuit save for en banc reversal.").
168. Judge Godbold, who was Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit prior to the division, will
become the first Chief Judge of the new Eleventh Circuit and the first individual in the
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Reavley 169 have come since the Reorganization Act was passed. This sec-
ond group of commentators and judges describes the issues as settled. At
least in the minds of the judges, therefore, the questions seem to have been
answered.
An informal questionnaire regarding the role of precedent in the courts
existing after the split was sent to the thirty-six senior and active judges of
the present Fifth Circuit. Twenty-three judges responded, although seven
of those responding declined to comment. 170 The overwhelming response
to the questionnaire was that the new Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh
Circuit would be bound by former Fifth Circuit precedent. 171 Assuming,
arguendo, that the issues are settled and that former Fifth Circuit prece-
nation's history to hold that position in two different circuits (THE THIRD BRANCH, March
1980, at 1, 9), unless, of course, the Eleventh is merely a continuation of the former Fifth. In
a speech to the midyear meeting of the Florida Bar, then-Judge Godbold was quoted as
saying, "We expect to adopt the Fifth Circuit's body of law which counsel may use as prece-
dents until they are overruled by the court sitting en banc." FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Jan. 25,
1981, at 6.
169. Judge Reavley, who will sit with the new Fifth Circuit after the split, has explained,
"There is general agreement that both circuits will indicate in their early en banc opinions
that old Fifth Circuit precedent will continue to govern, and I am confident that the judges
on each new circuit will carry out their judicial duties with care and dignity." Reavley,
supra note 110, at 11.
170. Chief Judge Godbold and Judges Charles Clark, Tjoflat, Thomas A. Clark, Hatch-
ett, Garza, and Randall declined to comment. Thirteen other judges declined to respond.
Except for letters declining comment, responses were anonymous.
171. The judges' responses are detailed as follows:
I. Should the new Fifth Circuit be bound by former Fifth Circuit
precedent?
AFFIRMATIVE NEGATIVE
A. All responses 14 2
1. New Fifth Circuit judges 8 1
(a) Active judges 6 1
(b) Senior judges 2 0
2. New Eleventh Circuit judges 6 1
(a) Active judges 4 0
(b) Senior judges 2 1
II. Should the new Eleventh Circuit be bound by former Fifth Circuit
precedent?
AFFIRMATIVE NEGATIVE
A. All responses 13 2
1. New Fifth Circuit judges 7 1
(a) Active judges* 5 1
(b) Senior judges 2 0
2. New Eleventh Circuit judges 6 1
(a) Active judges 4 0
(b) Senior judges 2 1
* One active new Fifth Circuit judge declined to answer for the other
court.
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dent will be binding in all three courts, 172 the effective implementation of
this decision remains unsettled. The next section of this Article will evalu-
ate potential methods of accomplishing this adornment of former Fifth
Circuit precedent.
B.
Three principal mechanisms are available for binding the new courts
with the precedents of the former Fifth Circuit: statute, stare decisis, and
local court rule. While this Article considers each of the three in turn, it
should be noted at the outset that the mechanism this analysis prefers is
the local court rule. 173 The Reorganization Act does not address the issue
whether the precedents of the former Fifth Circuit will bind the limited
version of the same court that temporarily survives the split or the new
Fifth or Eleventh Circuits. While the legislative history suggests that Con-
gress intended to create two new, independent, and autonomous circuit
courts of appeals, each unbridled by the decisional law of the former Fifth
Circuit, 174 Congress certainly could have provided a legislative require-
ment to that effect. 175 Congressional legislation controls much of the day-
to-day operation of the courts of appeals. Congress legislates circuit rule
Ill. What is the reason for your conclusion regarding the binding nature of
former Fifth Circuit precedent?
A. Affirmative responses**
Stare decisis 8
Stability and certainty 8
Convenience of attorneys 4
Concern for a particular area of precedent (civil 2
rights)
Other: "logic"; "a whole circuit with no
precedent?"; "because it will say so."
B. Negative responses
Other: "My guess is that the Court will follow them
when it wishes to and ignore them when it does
not approve them"; "Did God or the
Constitution or any source binding on a new
court say it was bound by decisions of a
predecessor court?"
** Those responding affirmatively unanimously indicated that precedent in
all areas would be binding, and rejected the notion that only certain
areas of precedent, such as civil rights, be transplanted.
IV. If the two new courts should be bound by the procedures of the former
Fifth Circuit, how should this be accomplished?***
Statute 0
New courts' local rules 5
Early panel decision establishing such a precedent 5
Early en banc decision establishing such a precedent 6
Consensus among the judges on the new courts 5
*** More than one selection was permissible.
172. But see Part III, section C infra.
173. If the questionnaire is any indication, only the statutory method lacks support on
the court. See note 171 supra, question IV.
174. See text accompanying notes 297-314 infra.
175. An express statutory solution would have given the two new courts less freedom
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making power, 176 the existence of the judicial council, 177 convening of the
judicial conference,1 78 the selection and authority of the chief judge, 79
convening of three-judge panels,1 80 and the en banc procedure itself.18 '
Surely, had Congress seen fit to do so, it could have legislated the effect of
former Fifth Circuit precedent in the two new circuits.
The doctrine of separation of powers defines the outermost constitu-
tional limits on this near plenary power "to ordain and establish" these
inferior courts. '8 2 Congress can create and destroy these courts, define and
define away their jurisdiction. Congress can redefine a court's jurisdiction
to avoid a particular decision, 8 3 overrule a statutory interpretation, ' 4 and
even begin the process for overruling a Supreme Court interpretation of
the Constitution. 8 5 Legislating the affirmative precedential effect of for-
mer Fifth Circuit case law in the three courts would have been akin to
these powers. Such a legislative determination of our three issues would
have been just one more exercise of the same power that sustained section
34 of the first Judiciary Act, the famous Rules Decision Act, 186 which gives
the decisions of state law of the state courts controlling effect in federal
courts, at least in some situations. 8 7 Such a legislative determination of
than they will have using stare decisis. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASON-
ING 7 (1949).
The history of the federal court system describes a congressional preoccupation with exer-
cising its constitutional power to "ordain and establish" the inferior federal courts, particu-
larly the intermediate level. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The 1980 Act itself establishes a
detailed implementation mechanism for determining the locus of adjudication for matters
both pending and submitted on the effective date. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 9.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 delegated to the numerous judges "super
circuits" power to reorganize their en banc function. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. 11 1978). These
are merely the two most recent examples of congressional authority over the circuit courts of
appeals.
176. 28 U.S.C. §§ 48, 2071 (1976).
177. Id. § 322.
178. Id. § 333.
179. Id. §§ 45, 292-95.
180. Id. §§ 43, 46(b).
181. Id. § 46(c).
182. While Congress cannot extend the jurisdiction of these courts beyond the Constitu-
tion, the disposition of power within the constitutional limit is for Congress alone. Compare
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), with Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
440 (1850). But see Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). See generally Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts.- A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 45 (1975).
183. E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); see Van Alstyne,,4 Critical
Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 229 (1973).
184. E.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modpfed, 339 U.S. 908 (1950),
overruled by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976).
185. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 1. Eg., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793),
overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XI (1798).
186. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see text accompanying notes 5-15
supra.
187. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842). The body of case law and literature on this subject are immense. See gener-




our three issues would have been akin to the criminal reception statutes
incorporating English common law offenses into the criminal code. 18 8 Re-
garding the later analogy, an answer to any appropriate argument that a
state sovereign legislature has more power than the legislature of the lim-
ited federal government is suggested in the "necessary and proper"
clause. 189 In this regard, the split of the Fifth Circuit was based on the
House Committee's finding, "the circuit split will better serve the residents,
attorneys, and litigants who reside or litigate within the six States involved
by creating a more functional and manageable judicial structure."'190
Surely, the same concerns could motivate and justify Congress in estab-
lishing former Fifth Circuit case law as precedent in the two new courts.' 9'
Congress did not provide an express mandate, however, and it therefore
remains to be determined how the new tribunals should implement the use
of former Fifth Circuit precedent. A number of possible judicial imple-
mentation mechanisms exist. The judges themselves seem to support vari-
ous alternative mechanisms, including judicial consensus, panel decision,
en banc decision, and court rule.
The simplest judicial implementation mechanism is judicial consensus.
Whenever an appellate issue would call for the application of federal com-
mon law, any panel of the new Fifth Circuit or new Eleventh Circuit sim-
ply could apply routinely the appropriate rule of the former Fifth Circuit,
subject to an en banc overruling. The most informal method by which to
reach this consensus would be for the judges to arrive at an express or tacit
understanding among themselves. Such an approach would lack any po-
licing procedure other than peer pressure. 192 A panel might be reluctant to
overrule a former Fifth Circuit precedent only out of a concern that its
exercise of such a power would acknowledge the power of a second panel
to overrule a precedent that the first panel desired to be followed. This
sanction is as attenuated as it is convoluted. It provides little check on the
independence of a circuit judge, even a judge powerless to act without a
concurring vote. 193 This approach also contradicts the notion of the or-
188. See generally Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 6 (1910). The trend in the criminal law is toward abolishing such statutes. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 (1962). But see United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958)
(upheld constitutionality of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)).
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 18. See also id. art. III, § 1.
190. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 9.
191. The judges, however, seem to be opposed to a legislative solution. See note 171
supra, question IV.
192. Perhaps litigants could seek compliance under the third-party beneficiary theory of
Lawrence v, Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977);
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
193. Classic examples of reciprocal peer pressure in the Fifth Circuit, which failed to
dampen the independence of either judge, are found in the concurring opinion of then Chief
Judge Hutcheson and the dissenting opinion of since Chief Judge grown in Refinery Em-
ployees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1959). The summary calendar
procedure of the Fifth Circuit expressly requires that panel action be unanimous before
dispensing with oral argument. 5TH CIR. R. 18.2. See Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d
526 (5th Cir. 1969). Even such a formal "agreement" is not always followed. See United
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derly administration of justice; it is a nonprocedure. 194 Aside from due
process concerns for fair notice to litigants and the instilled virtue of the
rule of law, misapprehension by the judges themselves could result easily.
Indeed, in answering the questionnaire, some responding judges explained
that a consensus already had been achieved by the judges on the new
courts, while others were of the opinion that former Fifth Circuit prece-
dent could be at most only persuasive authority in the new courts. 195 Fi-
nally, except for the most result-oriented, the fact alone that a consensus is
reached neither provides a rationale for nor assures the correctness of any
decision. ' 96
While a consensus, or at least majority, approach to the issue is a neces-
sary first step, it should not be relied upon to the exclusion of more formal
mechanisms. The two classic formal judicial mechanisms are the historic
stare decisis et non quieta moviere 197 and the modern judicial power to
promulgate rules. The focus of the inquiry thus shifts to a determination
of how best to formalize a judicial consensus when reached.
The most obvious judicial formalizing technique is the court decision,
the essence of the common law tradition. The quintessence of the court
decision is precedent, or the doctrine of stare decisis. The mechanism of
stare decisis initially must be distinguished from the policies underlying its
existence. Under Professor Levi's framework of analysis, the mechanism
of stare decisis has three stages: (1) a prior decision is identified that is
similar to the case to be decided; (2) a rule of law inherent in the prior
decision is discerned; (3) the rule of law is applied in the case to be de-
cided. 198 These three tasks devolve on the deciding court through the doc-
trine of dictum. 199 The facts are the starting point. The deciding court
begins the process by determining that the case to be decided has some
facts in common with a prior decided case.200 The deciding court next
distills a rule of law from the prior decision. What the prior court wrote
States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1980); Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065
(3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., reluctantly concurring under compulsion).
194. The rule of precedent would be illusory if a panel were to consider itself bound only
by the latest decision. See Williams v. W. Elec. Co., 618 F.2d 1110, 1111 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1980).
195. See note 171 supra.
196. See Part III, section C infra.
197. "To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1578 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The term is most often shortened to
stare decisis.
198. E. LEVI, supra note 175, at 2. For other approaches to precedent, see, e.g., B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1969);
K. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); E. PATTERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE (1953). For commentary on the doctrine of stare decisis in the unique con-
text of the federal appellate courts, see generally Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions
Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979); Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or Obiter Dicta?" The
Supreme Court and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15 GA. L. REV. 311 (1981).
199. E. LEVI, supra note 175, at 3. Some suggest that a dictum itself "represents no defin-
able concept." Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 514 (1952). See also Note,
Judicial Dictum Versus Obiter Dictum, 16 TEMP. L.Q. 427 (1942).
200. E. LEVI, supra note 175, at 3. But see Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis." Concern-




and intended serve only to guide the deciding court in determining the
legal significance of the prior decision.20' The common law thus can be
described as "certain, unchanging, and expressed in rules," while at the
same time it is "uncertain, changing, and only a technique for deciding
specific cases."'20 2 Given this theoretical framework, consider the possibil-
ity that a three-judge panel in the new Fifth Circuit or new Eleventh Cir-
cuit would seek to render the entire case law of the former Fifth Circuit
binding.
The avowed purpose of the judges on the two new circuit courts is to
render former Fifth Circuit precedent binding on all panels of the new
courts, subject to en banc overruling. An example may help bring the
problem into focus. Suppose the hypothetical appeal in Thomas v. Baker
presents to a panel of the new Eleventh Circuit20 3 the legal question
whether a transfer from a parent corporation to its wholly owned subsidi-
ary may ever, under any circumstances, be considered a separate sale to a
favored customer in a Robinson-Patman Act discrimination suit.20 4 In the
former Fifth Circuit, the answer was an emphatic "no." In Security Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Gales Rubber Co. 205 the former Fifth Circuit held that a
manufacturer's transfer of goods to its wholly owned sales subsidiary could
never be considered a separate sale to a favored customer in such a dis-
crimination claim.2°6 If the deciding court in Thomas v. Baker, the hypo-
thetical Eleventh Circuit panel, were still in the former Fifth Circuit, it
would be bound to answer the same question the same way.20 7 Now sup-
pose the hypothetical Eleventh Circuit deciding panel: (1) identifies the
factual similarities in the two cases; (2) discerns that the rule of law in the
former Fifth Circuit decision controls; and (3) applies the rule to conclude
that a Robinson-Patman Act claim is not established in Thomas v. Baker.
Suppose further that the hypothetical Eleventh Circuit deciding panel
"holds" that it must follow all former Fifth Circuit precedent en route to
deciding Thomas v. Baker. A second hypothetical Eleventh Circuit appeal
that raises the very same issue obviously must be decided the same way.
Yet this second appeal could be decided not on the former Fifth Circuit
201. E. LEVI, supra note 175, at 2-3.
202. Id. at 4.
203. The example also would apply to a panel of the new Fifth Circuit. See notes 285-88
infra. The need for an actual appeal seems irrefutable. Throughout this section the assump-
tion is made that the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals would abide by the
Article III "case or controversy" requirement and would not attempt to issue either a panel
or an en banc advisory opinion. See generaly H. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
88-90 (1912); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 64-70; Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Pres-
ent Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1959); Wagner, Advisory Opinions in the
Federal Judiciar--A Comparative Study, 27 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 86 (1958). Perhaps a
litigant in a pending case whose appeal would be affected by the decision to follow or over-
rule former Fifth Circuit precedent could bring an action for a declaratory judgment on the
issue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1976).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
205. 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1979).
206. But cf. id. at 967 n.3 (suggesting same result would be reached under rejected the-
ory).
207. See text accompanying notes 270-77 infra.
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precedent of Security Tire & Rubber Co., but on the decision of the first
hypothetical Eleventh Circuit panel in Thomas v. Baker itself. A panel of
the Eleventh Circuit could not overrule a prior panel decision of that same
court.20 8 Thomas v. Baker would be the controlling precedent; Security
Tire & Rubber Co. would be considered persuasive authority of another
court that was followed. The second hypothetical Eleventh Circuit panel
would have to "follow the leader," but its leader is the panel in Thomas v.
Baker rather than the panel in Security Tire & Rubber Co.
The first hypothetical Eleventh Circuit panel also "held" that all prece-
dents of the former Fifth Circuit are binding on the new Eleventh Circuit.
In later Eleventh Circuit appeals raising unrelated substantive questions,
the only similar "fact" in Thomas v. Baker from which a rule of law could
be discerned is the precedential status of former Fifth Circuit decisions.
These later Eleventh Circuit cases would have in common with Thomas v.
Baker only the circumstance that the former Fifth Circuit had answered
the substantive question they raise, just as it had answered the question
raised in Thomas v. Baker. This extraneous "fact" cannot be enough to
sustain the categorical application of former Fifth Circuit precedent in
every case. The contention cannot seriously be made that Thomas v.
Baker somehow becomes a conduit of former Fifth Circuit precedent and
is itself stare decisis for later Eleventh Circuit cases involving divergent
facts and raising divergent issues. Thomas v. Baker surely would control a
second Robinson-Patman Act case involving the same issue of defining a
favored sale, but the statement that all former Fifth Circuit precedent is
binding on Eleventh Circuit panels is merely a dictum. 20 9 The preceden-
tial impact of Thomas v. Baker cannot be said to incorporate former Fifth
Circuit case law covering antitrust doctrine under the Sherman Act and
Clayton Act,210 nor would it be precedent for Eleventh Circuit cases in-
volving such unrelated issues as defining a public figure for first amend-
ment purposes,2 1 determining whether a criminal prosecution was
unconstitutionally selective, 212 considering whether ancillary jurisdiction
exists in a diversity suit, 213 deciding whether the joint representation of a
husband and wife tried together is a per se violation of the sixth amend-
208. See id.
209. This would be so even under the most narrow definition of a dictum, which in turn
would give the broadest possible effect to stare decisis. "A dictum is a statement of law in
the opinion which could not logically, on the facts found, be a major premise for the selected
facts and the decision." E. PATTERSON, supra note 198, at 313. See also Goodhart, Deter-
mining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Oliphant, A Return to Stare
Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71 (1928). For a comparison of American and English notions of prece-
dent, see D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 154-56
(1963).
210. See, e.g., Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); Hayes v.
Solomon, 597 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
211. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978).




ment,214 or divining state law in diversity cases. 215 Such a result would be
magical, but it would not be stare decisis. 216
Considering a slightly different hypothetical, suppose the dictum in
Thomas v. Baker, that all former Fifth Circuit precedents were to be bind-
ing in the new Eleventh Circuit, expressed only a reluctant adherence to
that rule of law. The hypothetical panel might describe the law in the
former Fifth Circuit and suggest that, while as a matter of first impression
it would decide the issue differently, it is unable to overrule Security Tire &
Rubber Co. 217 The same analysis still would apply; certainly no one
would argue that Thomas v. Baker was any less of a precedent on the nar-
row Robinson-Patman Act issue, and only the en banc court could reverse
the decision. 218 To suggest, then, that the decision would become any
more of a precedent, that its holding was somehow transfigured and now
casts its shadow over the issues listed above and all others ever to be con-
sidered by an Eleventh Circuit panel, defies logic. 219 Once the panel deci-
sion mechanism is recognized as ineffective within this loose framework of
stare decisis, the corollary is that more stringent theories of stare decisis,
which would give our hypothetical Thomas v. Baker even narrower prece-
dential value, would be to no avail.220
A single panel decision of the new Eleventh Circuit cannot conceivably
bind the entire court to follow all of the former Fifth Circuit's precedent.
The mechanism of stare decisis cannot extend so far. Such a determina-
tion is beyond the level of application and is asymptotic to the doctrine.
At this level, stare decisis becomes "a principle of policy and not a
mechanical policy of adherence. '' 221 The pertinent question thus becomes
whether a three-judge panel is the appropriate forum to make the determi-
nation and announce the adoption of the entire corpus juris of the former
Fifth Circuit. Clearly the announcement by an Eleventh Circuit panel that
it is bound, or not bound, by Eleventh Circuit precedents means little if
anything.222 The policy of stare decisis does not depend for its viability on
214. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 569 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1978).
215. See, e.g., Moczygemba v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, Inc., 561 F.2d 1149
(5th Cir. 1977).
216. Mykkeltvedt, supra note 198, at 312. The same analysis applies to a case arising in
the new Fifth Circuit. If the hypothetical Thomas v. Baker had been decided in the new
Fifth Circuit, it could not serve as precedent on such extraneous issues. See notes 210-14
supra.
217. In Keel v. United States, 572 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978), the panel described the Fifth
Circuit precedents and lamented, "[sluch is the law of the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 1137. On
rehearing, the author of the panel opinion wrote an en banc opinion, in which the remaining
members of the panel joined, reversing and rejecting the principle of law that the panel haa
felt bound to apply. 585 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
218. See text accompanying notes 270-77 infra.
219. See notes 210-14 supra.
220. See, e.g., Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine f Stare Deciis and the Extent to
Which it Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV, 158 (1946); Clark & Trubek, The Creative
Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255
(1961); Radin, supra note 200; Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE ST. L. REV.
1043 (1975). See note 198 supra.
221. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
222. See notes 227-30 infra.
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an isolated application. The same can be said of the problem under con-
sideration; the announcement by an Eleventh Circuit panel that all panels
of the new court are to be bound by the precedents of the former Fifth
Circuit will not make it so.
Initially an en banc court in the new Eleventh Circuit might seem to be
the appropriate forum to make such a determination and announce that
Eleventh Circuit panels were bound to follow former Fifth Circuit case
law.223 The court could grant rehearing en banc in Thomas v. Baker .224
As far as the mechanism of precedent is concerned, the en banc court
would be subject to much the same restraints discussed regarding the hy-
pothetical panel, which need not be repeated here.225 Because all active
judges would sit on the Eleventh Circuit en banc court, the judicial pro-
nouncement of that court would be more representative than the decision
of a three-judge panel. Further, if the en banc decision were unanimous,
some vague notion of estoppel would arise should any of those judges de-
part from the announced rule while later sitting on panels. While the va-
lidity of the estoppel argument would be diluted over time, as new judges
were appointed to the court, by then a significant body of Eleventh Circuit
precedent would have developed. The en banc pledge also could be re-
newed from time to time.
Consideration of another factor, however, suggests that the en banc
court pronouncement incorporating former Fifth Circuit precedent would
have even less precedential value than a panel pronouncement. Such an
opinion would be no more than an instruction to the panels that they are to
be bound, while the en banc court itself claims the power to overrule for-
mer Fifth Circuit precedent. In terms of its application, the en banc pro-
nouncement would be merely an announcement of a consensus 226 akin to
the policy of stare decisis. While the Eleventh Circuit en banc consensus
that panels are to be bound by former Fifth Circuit precedent is of the
same order of magnitude as stare decisis, the two concepts are not the
same.227 The policy of stare decisis is not a creation of a particular case
precedent; it has a separate and unique vitality. The rule of precedents
does not depend on, but inheres in, decisional law. The new Eleventh Cir-
cuit en banc court, and a fortiori a panel, could not announce that deci-
sions of the Eleventh Circuit, en banc and panel, would never be binding
in the Eleventh Circuit. This would produce a paradox similar to that of
the Cretan liar who said, "I always tell lies.' ' 228 If the Eleventh Circuit is
to be bound by decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, that conclusion
should be reached independently, and the underlying premises for the con-
223. Judge Reavley has explained: "There is general agreement that both circuits will
indicate in their early en banc opinions that old Fifth Circuit precedent will continue to
govern .... Reavley, supra note 110, at 11.
224. See text accompanying notes 203-19 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 198-219 supra.
226. See text accompanying notes 192-97 supra.
227. See text accompanying notes 198-219 supra.
228. The allegory is from Stone--de Montpensier, The Compleat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1001, 1015 (1966).
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clusion should be articulated; the court should do more than merely an-
nounce a consensus. First, the court should choose rationally between any
alternatives that are presented.229 Secondly, the court should articulate
and announce the rationale for its choice. While the en banc court might
choose simply to say that stare decisis means that the former Fifth Circuit
precedents bind, saying it is so does not make it so. The court's mastery
over stare decisis does not extend so far.2
30
The rulemaking power of the court provides an administrative alterna-
tive to the judicial mechanisms of panel or en banc decisions. 231 This al-
ternative, however, presents its own problems. The new Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits will have congressionally delegated au-
thority to "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. '232 Theoreti-
229. This is, after all, the minimum judicial expectation imposed by the Constitution on
the other co-equal branches. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938).
230. "I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice. said. Humpty Dumpty
smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you. I mean 'there's
a nice knock-down argument for you!"' "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice
knock-down argument,'" Alice objected. "When I use a word," Humpty
Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you
can make words mean different things." "The question is," said Humpty
Dumpty, "which is to be master-that s all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, quoted in United States v. Kindrick, 576 F.2d
675, 677 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Hand, 576 F.2d 472, 477 n.l (5th Cir. 1975)
(en banc dissent).
231. The judicial council is a second administrative aspect of the courts of appeals.
Comprised of the chief judge and all the regular active circuit judges, the council is designed
and functions as an administrative body and not as the court en banc. Chandler v. Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 83 n.5, 86 n.7 (1970). As such, the judicial council
is empowered to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts within its circuit." 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (Supp. III 1979). Because
members of the council serve as individuals and not as circuit judges, the council may oper-
ate as an executive or as a legislature, and is not bound by the Article III limits on courts
imposed by the separation of powers doctrine. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949); In re Rodebaugh, 10 F.R.D. 207 (3d Cir. 1970)
(Judicial Council). Acting in a legislative mode, the judicial councils of the two new circuits
could issue an order directing that former Fifth Circuit precedent control panels. A report-
ing problem would have to be overcome; actions of the judicial councils usually are not
disseminated widely. Moreover, while a legislative approach may be preferred, see notes
174-91 supra, a provision in the local rules of the new circuits would be more desirable. See
text accompanying notes 237-49 infra. The historical function of the judicial councils has
been directed toward the efficiency of the district courts. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613
F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 880 (1973); Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973). See generally Comment, The Authority of the Circuit Judicial Councils.- Separation of
Powers in the Courts ofAppeals, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 815 (1974).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.
Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed by the Supreme Court." This authority is continued in FED. R. App. P. 47 which
provides:
Each court of appeals by action of a majority of the the circuit judges in regu-
lar active service may from time to time make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules. In all cases not provided for by rule,
the courts of appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsis-
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cally, each could adopt a local rule providing that the precedents of the
former Fifth Circuit are to bind panels in the new courts. Such an ap-
proach raises several concerns. If such a rule Was inconsistent with the Act
of Congress creating the new courts, it would be invalid.233 Also, present
Fifth Circuit rules do not cover the rule of precedent in Fifth Circuit deci-
sions.234
While the matter of precedent may appear more appropriately handled
through judicial action than by rulemaking, the conceptual difficulties in-
herent in such an approach already have been discussed. 235 A rule would
be efficient, 236 and if legitimate, it instantly would incorporate former
Fifth Circuit case law across the board. Such a wholesale adoption of
Fifth Circuit precedent, however, might generate unnecessary en banc re-
hearings, because only that mechanism would be available for reconsider-
ation of former Fifth Circuit precedents.
Rulemaking by the courts of appeals resembles a legislative process. In
its adjudicative role, the court is limited by such restraints as the "case or
controversy" requirement and the doctrine of stare decisis. The court's
rulemaking process is not subject to these limits, but neither is it subject to
comparable safeguards on the legislative process. 237 Court rules are often
the product of secluded decisionmaking without an opportunity for public
involvement. This shortcoming can be remedied easily by public dissemi-
nation of the proposed rule to the bar in the new circuits, with an opportu-
nity to respond. 238
The rulemaking solution also would be subject to debate on the merits
of such an approach. 23 9 In the presumed absence of congressional deci-
tent with these rules. Copies of all rules made by a court of appeals shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.
For an account of the historical origins of the rulemaking power, see Weinstein, Reform of
Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 916-17 (1976). Such rules
have the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pace, 183 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976). See also Jimenez v. Aristiguieta, 314 F.2d 649 (5th
Cir.), ceri. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). See also text accompanying notes 306-25 infra. The
question also arises whether such a proposal would be inconsistent with or supplemental to
FED. R. App. P. 35, which deals with general en banc procedures. An inconsistent local rule
would be void. See note 232 supra. An inherent power to declare rules is unlikely. See
Weinstein, supra note 232, at 907. See also J. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE
COURTS (1980). Any constitutional argument that Congress cannot delegate rulemaking
power has been overruled by history. See id. at 927-31; Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S.
343 (1959). Some minimal constitutional restrictions on rulemaking power exist, however,
such as overbreadth. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1975); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975). The courts of
appeals may impose narrower restrictions than those constitutionally required. See United
States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 330 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975).
234. See text accompanying notes 270-77 infra.
235. See text accompanying notes 192-230 supra.
236. See Weinstein, supra note 232, at 910.
237. See generally id.
238. The Ninth Circuit's approach to § 6 of the Omnibus Judgeship Bill could be fol-
lowed. See note 118 supra. For a suggested procedure for use in the new courts for adopt-
ing local rules, see Weinstein, supra note 232, at 963-64.
239. See Part III, section C infra.
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sion,240 judicial action is fraught with interminable problems. 241 The ad-
ministrative rulemaking procedure is an alternative. A proposed rule is
offered here for adoption by the new courts of appeals as part of their en
banc procedure: 242
EN BANC REVIEW BEFORE PANEL DECISION
(A) A proposed opinion, approved by a panel of this court reaching
a result that would overrule a decision of the former fifth circuit
shall not be issued unless it is first circulated among the active
members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to
consider the case en banc.
(B) When the panel opinion is issued after compliance with (A), the
published opinion shall contain a footnote referring to this rule
and worded, depending on the circumstances, as follows:
This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court
in regular, active service. [No judge favored, or A majority did
not favor] an en banc consideration on the question of [e.g.,
overruling Thomas v. Baker].
Recalling that Learned Hand once described federal judges as "curi-
ously timid about innovations," 243 this offered rule is an overt compro-
mise. It would not make the former Fifth Circuit case law completely
binding on panels in the new courts. Instead, a panel would have author-
ity to accept or reject the former Fifth Circuit precedent. Recognizing the
parent circuit and a legitimate concern for continuity, however, the panel's
authority would be limited by the requirement that the opinion be circu-
lated to the en banc court. Opinion circulation is the most effective intra-
mural procedure for determining "enbancworthiness" before the panel
decision.244 Limiting opinion circulation to opinions that "would overrule
a decision of the former fifth circuit," presumably reduces the amount of
time required for monitoring the procedure.245 While institutionalized
second-guessing might increase the proportion of requests for rehear-
ings,246 the need for en banc courts might well be decreased due to the
initial involvement of a "multitude of counselors. '247 The number of en
banc rehearings would depend on the new court's perception of the need to
part ways with the former Fifth Circuit. The proposed rule would foster
an independence in the new courts that a completely binding rule would
240. But see text accompanying notes 297-314 infra.
241. See text accompanying notes 199-230 supra.
242. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 16; 7TH CIR. R. 16(e). A written rule, while perhaps techni-
cally not required, would be necessary to achieve the desired effect. See, e.g., Payne v.
Garth, 285 F. 301 (8th Cir. 1922).
243. Hand, The Contribution of An Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 155, 158 (Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
244. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 271-72 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); K. LLEWELYN, supra note 198, at 315-16.
245. Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institu-
tional Responsibilities, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 726, 728 (1965).
246. Roscoe Pound termed this effect the "rehearing evil." R. POUND, supra note 5, at
373.
247. See generally Jones, Multitude of Counselors.- Appellate Adjudication As Group Deci-
sion-Making, 54 TUL. L. REV. 541 (1980).
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stifle. In addition to implementing the proposed rule, the new circuits
could streamline the en banc procedure itself by having the issue of over-
ruling the former Fifth Circuit submitted on briefs. In this special cate-
gory, polling on the merits possibly could be accomplished by mail. This
compromise 248 avoids the difficulties of a completely binding rule treating
former Fifth Circuit precedent as if it were decided by the new court, as
well as the assumed problem of regarding former Fifth Circuit precedent
as if it were as unrelated to the new courts as a decision from any of the
other circuits. 249
Finally, this discussion must turn to the appropriateness of this second
assumption. The progressively narrowed focus now must be broadened to
consider whether former Fifth Circuit precedent should have a special sta-
tus in the new courts.
C.
In the course of this Article, the assumption has been that the precedents
of the former Fifth Circuit will bind the limited Fifth Circuit that survives
the Reorganization Act, the new Fifth Circuit, and the new Eleventh Cir-
cuit.2 50 Before examining the merits of this assumption, the tensions
among panels and between panels and the en banc court must be appreci-
ated. In a sense, the development of separate panel and en banc functions
is a continuation of two leitmotifs in the history of the federal court sys-
tem. This development largely has been the product of a congressional
preoccupation with the centrality and importance of the intermediate
tier,251 coupled with constant institutional pressures from the surrounding
two layers. 252
No intermediate appellate court in the federal system existed before the
1891 Evarts Act created the circuit courts of appeals. 2 53 These courts were
not to make law, however; that role was reserved for the Supreme Court.
The new courts' function was rather "to correct individual injustice and
248. This proposal is based in large measure on the approach taken by the Seventh Cir-
cuit regarding panel overrulings of Seventh Circuit precedent. 7TH CIR. R. 16(e) provides:
(e) Rehearings Sua Sponte Before Decision. A proposed opinion approved
by a panel of this court adopting a position which would overrule a prior
decision of this court or create a conflict between or among circuits shall not
be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this
court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear in banc the issue of whether
the position should be adopted. In the discretion of the panel, a proposed
opinion which would establish a new rule of procedure may be similarly circu-
lated before it is issued. When the position is adopted by the panel after com-
pliance with this procedure, the opinion, when published, shall contain a
ootnote worded, depending on the circumstances, in substance as follows:
This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court in regular
active service. (No judge favored, or A majority did not favor) a rehear-
ing in banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe.)
249. See notes 275, 277 infra.
250. See text accompanying notes 161-72 supra.
251. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
253. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27.
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control erroneous or lawless behavior by judges or other officials. ' 254 Two
basic features of the new circuit courts of appeals were taken from the pre-
existing circuit courts. First, the jurisdictional boundaries of the new
courts were drawn along the geographical lines of the nine existing cir-
cuits. 255 Secondly, Congress incorporated the circuit court panel proce-
dure, declaring that the circuit courts of appeals "shall consist of three
judges. '' 25 6 While the Judicial Code of 1911 abolished the circuit courts, it
maintained the provision for three-judge courts of appeals. 257 The 1911
Code also provided for more than three judgeships in some circuits, and
whether a "court" was to be composed of three or all of the judges as-
signed to a circuit soon became unclear.258
As caseloads increased, additional judgeships were added.259 By 1938
all but two of the circuits had more than three circuit judges, although only
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals regularly sat en banc.
260
As increased numbers of judges made possible more multiples of three-
judge panels, the courts of appeals needed procedures in order to preserve
two institutional values: uniformity among panel decisions and control of
the law of the circuit by a majority of its judges. 26' The en banc court,
with all active members of the court sitting together, would become a vehi-
cle to preserve these two values.
The catalyst for formalizing the en banc function in the courts of ap-
peals was a conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit. A
Ninth Circuit panel had held that Congress had authorized only a three-
judge court.262 Soon afterwards the Third Circuit began to sit en banc in
certain cases. 263 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
254. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 200 (1976).
255. The federal system had been divided into nine circuits in 1866. Act of July 23, 1866,
ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
256. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27.
257. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 117-18, 36 Stat. 1131, 1131.
258. Id. A 1912 amendment made explicit which circuit court judges were to sit on an
assigned court of appeals, but further blurred the definition of "court." Act of January 13,
1912, ch. 9, § 118, 37 Stat. 52, 53.
259. Typically, the judges were added to the "circuit," not to the "court," evincing a
congressional intention to enlarge the tribunal rather than the panel. See Note, The Power
of a Circuit Court ofAppeals to Sit En Banc, 55 HARV. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1942). The
growth of the intermediate tier has been dramatic. The 1891 structure provided for nine
circuits, each having three judges. Today eleven circuits and 132 appellate judgeships exist.
The former Fifth Circuit had one fewer judge than the total number originally provided for
the entire country. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3(b), 92 Stat.
1629, 1632 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1976)).
260. Act of Ausust 3, 1949, ch. 387, § 1, 63 Stat. 493, 493. This was due, in part, to the
District of Columbia court's unique status as the equivalent of a state supreme court for the
District. See generally Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts ofAppeals." Accommo-
dating Institutional Responsibilities (Parts I & I1), 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 563 & 726, 571 n.60
(1965).
261. See Note, United States v. Mandel: The Problem of Evenly Divided Votes in En Banc
Hearings in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 66 MD. L. REV. 919, 920 (1980).
262. Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.), certified, 304 U.S. 264
(1938).
263. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (en
banc), afl'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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flict, and held in Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Commissioner that a court
of appeals possessed an inherent right to sit en banc. z64 Congress codified
this holding in the Judicial Code of 1948, which required a majority vote
of the active judges in a circuit to convene an en banc court, thereby insur-
ing that the more efficient panels would continue to be the primary mode
of operation.2 65 In 1953 the Supreme Court reconsidered and elaborated
upon both its holding in Textile Mills and Congress's 1948 codification of
that opinion. Two questions remained unanswered: Which cases were ap-
propriate for en banc hearing and what internal procedures were necessary
to accomplish an en banc hearing. In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v.
Western Pacific Railroad Co. 266 the Court held that the filing of a petition
for a rehearing en banc did not compel the full court either to sit or con-
duct a poll on whether to sit en banc. According to the Court, the petition
was only the litigant's suggestion of the appropriateness of convening the
full court; a judge could request a poll sua sponte. The Court also was
careful to distinguish between the panel's decision to rehear and the full
court's decision to rehear. While the Court did not describe any detailed
procedures, it stated that any procedures adopted were to be made pub-
lic. 267 Following this decision, a confused and often mysterious patchwork
of en banc procedures was developed by the individual circuits.268 Finally
the Supreme Court codified the institutional value justifications for en
banc courts in the 1968 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) provides:
A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may
order that an appeal or other proceedings be heard or reheard by the
court of appeals in banc. Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored
and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by
the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its deci-
sions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
importance.
Beyond the basic provisions of this rule, each circuit may prescribe intra-
mural procedures, and a majority has done S0.269 By 1968 the courts of
264. 314 U.S. 326, 331-35 (1941). See also Comment, The En Banc Procedures of the
United States Courts ofAppeals, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 447 (1954).
265. See Comment, In Bane Procedures in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 43 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 401, 403 (1974). The current version provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of
not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in
banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in
regular active service. A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in
regular active service.
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
486, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 1629, 1633. For a detailed review of the legislative history of the 1948
codification, see Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250-60
(1953).
266. 345 U.S. 247 (1953). See generally Mars, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Bane, 14
F.R.D. 91 (1954).
267. 345 U.S. at 260-62.
268. See Note, En Bane Procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 11l U. PA. L. REV.
220, 221-28 (1962).
269. See D.C. CIR. R. 14; IST CIR. R. 16; 3D CIR. R. 2(3); 5TH CIR. R. 16; 6TH CIR. R. 14;
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appeals had grown not only in size but in importance. More intermediate
appeals meant more judges.270 When caseload pressures in the Supreme
Court necessitated the use of more discretionary control over that Court's
docket, the courts of appeals began to share in the role of developing the
law.271 The increase in circuit-level judgeships increased the risk of in-
tracircuit conflict, threatening the institutional values of uniformity and
majority judge control. The en banc court was the logical device for main-
taining the uniformity of a majority of the court, so that there would be but
one court, sitting in divisions.272 Until the advent of the "super courts"
having more than fifteen judges, the en banc mechanism was effective. 273
Because convening an en banc court involves substantial delay and ex-
pense, however, the scarcity of judicial resources dictates that its use be
minimized. One method of controlling the need for convening the en banc
court is for the panels to treat earlier decisions of any panel as binding
precedent, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court action.274 This
7TH CIR. R. 16; 8TH CIR. R. 7; 9TH CIR. R. 12. For graphic portrayals of the individual
circuit's en banc experiences, see Note, supra note 261, at 941; Note, supra note 260, at 603-
08. For a discussion of the states' experiences with divisional panels, en banc courts, and
intermediate appellate courts generally, see M. OSTHUS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS
(1976); Hopkins, The Role of.An Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459
(1975).
270. See note 259 supra. For the Fifth Circuit's experience with adding judges, see text
accompanying notes 93-120 supra. See generally Evans, F!fty Years of United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, 9 Mo. L. REV. 189 (1944).
271. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1941); P. CAR-
RINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 254, at 200-01; Hopkins, supra note
269. Judge Lay suggests that the transformation should be completed. Lay, supra note 77,
at 1158.
272. The decision of a panel is considered a decision of the court. See Western Pac. R.R.
Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
273. As the size of the full court grew out of all proportion to the three-judge panel, the
device became more and more unwieldly:
Twenty judges cannot conduct a meaningful hearing, nor can they effectively
deliberate. As the number of judges within a circuit is increased, en banc pro-
cedures become not only less effective, but more costly and more dilatory and
therefore less likely to be invoked. Thus, it becomes less useful as an implicit
restraint on the individual panels. Indeed, as the size of the court increased,
the likelihood of differences among the judges is increased.
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts ofAppeals." The Threat to the Function of Re-
view and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 584 (1969). See also P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 254, at 201-02. Between 1977 and 1978 the en banc
rehearings in the Fifth Circiit nearly tripled, which compounded the problem. See Note,
supra note 261, at 941. With such large en banc courts, the problems grew even worse; delay
and division became pronounced. See, e.g., Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d
504 (5th Cir. 1980) (on rehearing en banc for two years); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th
Cir. 1980) (en banc court divided in five opinions). See also text accompanying notes 119-31
supra.
En banc rehearings appear to be a necessary evil. The advantages of their elimination-
reducing costs and delay for the courts and litigants and increasing the finality of panel
decisions--are outweighed by the concomitant sadvantages of abolition--the loss of re-
straint on panels and intracircuit conflicts. See Note, supra note 261, at 934 n.65. Cf. R.
POUND, supra note 5, at 373-74. For a glimpse of the awesomeness of the undivided Fifth
Circuit docket, see Rubin, Introduction to Fifth Circuit Symposium, 25 Loy. L. REV. 441
(1979). See also note 140 supra.
274. ABA STANDARDS RE APPELLATE COURTS § 3.01, Commentary, at 12 (Tent. Draft
1976). This rule should be distinguished from the related "law of the case" doctrine, which
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rule of interpanel accord is well-ingrained in the precedents of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals 275 and each of its sibling circuits. 276 Within this
context of panel/panel and panel/en banc court relations, the three ques-
tions previously raised about the use of former Fifth Circuit precedent in
the three new courts must be considered.2 77
An examination of the effect of the precedents of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit decided before the effective date of the Reorganization Act on the
limited version of the Fifth Circuit temporarily surviving the split involves
an analysis of the obvious. The Reorganization Act insures that the for-
mer Fifth Circuit will continue to decide cases submitted before the effec-
tive date of the Act.2 78 In the decision of these matters, the former Fifth
Circuit will be constrained to follow the rule of interpanel accord requiring
a panel to treat as binding all earlier decisions of another panel, absent
intervening en banc or Supreme Court review.2 79 The en banc court of the
involves two panels deciding different phases of the same case. See, e.g., EEOC v. Int'l
Longshoreman's Ass'n, 623 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1980); Potaashnick v. Port City Constr. Co.,
609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978) (en
banc), aft'd, 444 U.S. 472 (1979).
275. Discussing the challenge of sitting on a court composed of 26 active and 10 senior
judges, Judge Hill emphasized the importance of the rule:
Whether or not such a body can fairly and efficiently articulate, in one
voice, the law affecting nearly 50 million people remains to be seen. I submit
that our success may in large part depend on our adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis. If we give only lip service to the rule that one panel is bound by
pnor panel decisions, we run the risk of transforming what has heretofore
een an orderly institution into an inconsistent, unpredictable body, made up
of three-judge panels that resemble waterbugs chasing each other around and
around the surface of a summer pond.
Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1283 (5th Cir. 1980) (Hill, J., dissenting in part).
Because of institutional pressures, the rule of interpanel accord seems to play a more
significant role in the law of the larger circuits, such as the Fifth. See, e.g., Dahl v. Akin, 630
F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980); Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1980); Williams v. Blazer Financial Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1976); Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1976); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 522 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975); Burroughs
v. United States, 515 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1975); Popeko v. United States, 513 F.2d 771 (5th
Cir. 1975); Linebery v. United States, 512 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lewis,
475 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1972); Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc., 221 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 839 (1955).
276. See, e.g., Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1980); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transp., 618 F.2d 1037
(4th Cir. 1980); Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Haas v. Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.
1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 330 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1964);
United States v. United States Vanadium Co., 230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956); E. Edelmann &
Co. v. Triple-A Speciality Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937); Omaha v. Omaha Elec. Light &
Power Co., 255 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1919). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R. FED. 274 (1978). Panels
occasionally depart from this rule. See, e.g., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552
F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cf.
Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
Such departures may raise complicated problems of procedure. See Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 260.
277. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
278. Reorganization Act, supra note 147, § 9; see text accompanying notes 151-55 supra.
279. See note 275 supra.
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former Fifth Circuit will not be so bound, as was also true before the Reor-
ganization Act. This rule of interpanel accord, based on the need for uni-
formity within a circuit, maintains the rule of one law of the circuit.
Although the judges sit in panels of three, they are judges for the whole
court, and the court's position on the law represents the view of all, or at
least a majority, of the judges who comprise the court. The judges are
equals, as are the three-judge panels. 280 Permitting the primacy of one
panel over another would demean the integrity of the overruled panel and
its members and would destroy the notion of uniformity within a circuit.
28
'
The continuation of the former Fifth Circuit is of significance with re-
spect to the viability of former Fifth Circuit precedent in the two new
courts of appeals. Decisions of former Fifth Circuit panels on matters sub-
mitted before the effective date and decisions of the en banc court in mat-
ters decided by a panel before the effective date are to be processed as if
the Reorganization Act had not been enacted. 282 If the two new courts of
appeals conclude that former Fifth Circuit precedent is to bind their
panels, a group of cases not decided until after the effective date would be
included. A former Fifth Circuit panel could thus decide an issue of first
impression after the issue had been decided by a panel of one of the new
courts. Requiring the panel in the former Fifth Circuit to abide by the
decision of the new court's panel would be inconsistent with the rule of
precedent. 283 If a conflict between decisions of a former Fifth Circuit
panel and a panel of the new court were to be treated as a genuine conflict
between two panels of the same court, the en banc procedures of both the
former Fifth Circuit and the new circuit would be engaged. A confronta-
tion of two en banc courts might result, with the judges on one court com-
prising half the second court.284 While such an occurrence is nearly
280. The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc is to
enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possi-
ble for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to secure uni-
formity and continuity in its decisions, while enabling the court at the same
time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure of having panels of
three judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no division
exists within the court.
United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960) (quoting Maris,
supra note 266, at 96). But see United States v. Mathies, 350 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965). Of the
cases decided on oral hearings in 1978, the Fifth Circuit decided thirty en banc and 822 in
panel. Note, supra note 261, at 941.
281. Stare decisis requires that a precedent in a panel's own circuit control a conflicting
precedent in another circuit. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. R.R. v. Tyler, 375 F.2d 938 (5th Cir.
1967); Ashe v. Commission, 288 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1961). Conflicts between circuits are for
Supreme Court resolution. See S. CT. R. 17(l)(a).
282. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 9; see text accompanying notes 151-55 supra.
283. Testing this conclusion by stretching assumptions, if a panel in each of the two new
courts had decided the issue differently, the former Fifth Circuit panel would face the
double bind with two conflicting precedents.
284. An even more absurd situation is theoretically possible, in which a former Fifth
Circuit panel might not agree with either of two new court panels. The result would be a
triple confrontation of en banc courts. Of course, such situations are unlikely to occur. Nev-
ertheless, they explore the theory of precedent. A second problem inherent in having the
former Fifth Circuit convene en banc would be the awkwardness of having a grande en banc
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beyond the realm of possibility, it illustrates the notion that extending the
rule of interpanel accord to panels of another circuit has a potential to
create untoward tension in the intermediate tier of the federal court sys-
tem.
Questions concerning the effect of precedents of the former Fifth Circuit
in the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits ought to be considered together.
The two new courts of appeals stand in the same relation to the former
Fifth Circuit; neither is any more nor less a continuation of the parent
circuit. The numbering of the courts of appeals for the new circuits is com-
pletely irrelevant to the question of the applicability of former Fifth Cir-
cuit precedent. The 1972 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System recommended that the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, and Texas be formed into a new eleventh circuit and that Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia be formed into a new fifth circuit.285 Under the 1977
Senate Bill, the new fifth circuit would have covered the Canal Zone, Ala-
bama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, and the new eleventh circuit
would have covered Louisiana and Texas.286 The Reorganization Act la-
bels the court of appeals for the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas the new Fifth Circuit and calls the court of appeals for Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia the new Eleventh Circuit.287 The suggestion that the
precedents of the former Fifth Circuit will be binding, if at all, on only the
new court of appeals carrying the number five thus defies credulity. This
would mean that between the 1972 Commission recommendation, the
1977 Senate Bill, and the 1980 Act, stare decisis ffip-flopped, waxed, and
waned.288
In determining the role of precedent in the newly divided circuits, the
obvious first step is to consult precedent. Congress split one circuit into
two courts of appeals in 1929,289 and added a Tenth Circuit to the nine
settle a conflict between two en bane courts. See Reavley, supra note 110, at 5-6; notes 127-
28 supra..
285. Commission on Revision, supra note 91, at 232; see text accompanying notes 87-92
supra.
286. S. 11, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); see text accompanying notes 100-19 supra.
287. Reorganization Act, supra note 148, § 10.
288. The new Fifth Circuit has been defined to include Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
under the 1972 Commission recommendation; the Canal Zone, Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia under the 1977 Senate Bill; and the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas
under the Reorganization Act. It further defies credulity to argue that Congress decided to
apply former Fifth Circuit precedents to the Panama Canal Zone on the basis of airline
schedules, the ultimate reason for using the House version instead of the Senate version of
the Reorganization Act. Compare S. 2830, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) with H.R. 7665, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See Hearing on H.R. 7665, supra note 138, at 37. See also Brown,
supra note 166, at 417.
289. While the circuit courts had limited appellate jurisdiction and were reorganized in
1801, 1802, 1837, and 1866, they were not then principally appellate courts and had not
developed any significant independence in terms of precedent. See Appendix infra; text
accompanying notes 23-59 supra. The circuit courts of appeals were created in 1891 for the
existing circuits. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826. See notes 60-69 supra.
Thus, the first significant reorganization of the geographical lines of the circuit courts of
appeals before the Reorganization Act occurred in 1929. The District of Columbia Circuit
was added formally as a separate circuit in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773,
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existing courts of appeals by detaching six states from the Eighth Cir-
CUit.290 Neither the 1929 statute nor its legislative history provides any
significant clue to the role of preexisting Eighth Circuit precedent in the
reconstituted Eighth Circuit and the newly created Tenth Circuit.29' Fol-
lowing the congressional lead, the two courts of appeals involved seem to
have largely ignored the question. The Eighth Circuit went about its busi-
ness, following its prior precedent rather than that of the new Tenth Cir-
cuit.292 The new Tenth Circuit generally followed preexisting Eighth
Circuit precedent, 293 occasionally striking out on its own.294 The dearth of
court of appeals cases295 considering this problem may be explained by
§ 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870, codifying Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). This was
not a division of one court into two, but merely the recognition of the creation of a single
court. See id. Reviser's Notes. Thus, the creation of the Tenth Circuit is the only similar
legislative action. See generally Appendix infra.
290. Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45 Stat. 1346. The new Eighth Cir-
cuit included Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The new
Tenth Circuit included Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
Id. Both circuits have remained geographically constant.
291. Id. The House and Senate Committee reports provide conflicting indications, stat-
ing that "[t]his bill will divide the eighth circuit into two circuits, thus creating an additional
circuit . . . ." This seems to suggest that only the new Tenth Circuit was considered a
creation, while the shrunken Eighth Circuit was deemed a continuation. Yet the committees
also referred to the "new eighth circuit" and "new tenth circuit." H.R. REP. No. 2464, 70th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1929); S. REP. No. 1843, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1929). See also
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 5690, HR. 13567, HR.
13757, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1928-1929). For an account of the history of the Tenth Circuit
as told through its judges, see Breitenstein, The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Judicial Circuit, 52 DEN. L.J. 9 (1975).
292. See, e.g., Adams v. Hagerott, 34 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1929); Barrett v. United States,
33 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1929); Beck v. United States, 33 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1929).
293. See, e.g., Coyle v. United States, 34 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1929); Tiller v. United
States, 34 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1929); Keaton v. Little, 34 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1929); Weicker
v. Bromfield, 34 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1929); Morrison v. White, 34 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1929).
Other cases decided soon after the division suggest that the law of all of the courts of appeals
was largely homogenous, indicating that the Eighth Circuit rule was the law in other courts
of appeals. See, e.g., Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1929); Rishel v.
McPherson County, 34 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1929); United States v. Jackson, 34 F.2d 241
(10th Cir. 1929); Tingley v. United States, 34 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1929); Wenner, Harris &
Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1929); Martin v. United States, 33 F.2d
1022 (10th Cir. 1929).
294. See, e.g., Elmhurst Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1929); Hough
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 34 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1929). See also United States v. Golden,
34 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1929); Kansas City, Mo. v. Fairfax Drainage Dist., 34 F.2d 357 (10th
Cir. 1929).
295. One district court case is worthy of mention. In Thompson v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 5 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Okla. 1934), the district court noted a conflict of authorities
between the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, and chose to follow the Eighth Circuit on
the basis of some pragmatic logic:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is controllin& of this court, has not
passed upon the question, and since there is a difference in the holdings of two
Circuit Courts of Appeals, the question is properly for the United States
Supreme Court, rather than for this court's determination. However, it is not
difficult to decide that the ruling of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is
controlling of the decision of the question now before the court. This court
was formerly a part of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, having become disengaged
therefrom upon the creation of the Tenth Judicial Circuit. The decisions of
the Eighth Judicial Circuit are binding upon this court in the absence of deci-
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observing that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit has been
committed strongly to the rule of interpanel accord. 296 The creation of the
Tenth Circuit precedent, therefore, is inconclusive.
The Reorganization Act and its legislative history strongly suggest that
the two new circuits are indeed new, and need not be bound by former
Fifth Circuit precedents. Clearly, legislative intent controls in such mat-
ters. 297 The argument that Congress intended to create two completely
autonomous circuits, independent from one another and from the former
Fifth Circuit, is a convincing one.
First, consider the background of the split. The 1972 Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, which precipitated the
legislative effort creating two new circuits, expressed a disinclination to-
ward general geographical reorganization, based on a concern that redraw-
ing boundaries would somehow change the law in the affected circuits:
We have not recommended a general realignment of all circuits.
To be sure, the present boundaries are largely the result of historical
accident and do not satisfy such criteria as parity of caseloads and
geographical compactness. But these boundaries have stood since the
nineteenth century, except for the creation of the Tenth Circuit in
1929, and whatever the actual extent of variation in the law from cir-
cuit to circuit, relocation would take from the bench and bar at least
some of the law nowfamiliar to them. Moreover, the Commission has
heard eloquent testimony evidencing the sense of community shared
by lawyers and judges within the present circuits. Except for the most
compelling reasons, we are reluctant to disturb institutions which
have acquired not only the respect but also the loyalty of their constit-
uents.298
sions of the Tenth Circuit. It is proper to observe that the decision of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Newell v. Bryam, supra, was rendered by
Hon. Walter H. Sanborn, and concurred in by Hon. Robert E. Lewis, then a
member of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Hon. Orie L. Phillips,
then a District Judge within the Eighth Circuit, but sitting as a member of the
Eighth Circuit Court. Upon the creation of the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Hon. Robert E. Lewis was designated as a member of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and is its senior Circuit Judge at this time. Hon. One L.
Phillips was appointed a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
is now a member of that court. Thus, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision was rendered by two of the present judges of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and in my opinion the decision is controlling of this court. How-
ever, I have no difficulty in following the decision as I consider it sound upon
principle and the proper construction of the statute involved.
Id. at 789.
296. See United States v. United States Vanadium Corp., 230 F.2d 646, 649 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956) ("We feel that one panel of the court should not lightly
overrule a decision by another panel."); Omaha v. Omaha Elec. Light & Power Co., 255 F.
801, 805 (8th Cir. 1919) (applying rule by implication before division). These two courts of
appeals rarely invoke the rule of interpanel accord. Compare the cases cited in notes 275-76
supra.
297. See cases collected in 21 C.J.S. Courts § 134, at 203 n.54 (1954). See generally text
accompanying notes 173-91 supra. If "courts are less free in applying a statute than in deal-
ing with case law," (E. LEVI, supra note 175, at 7) then courts ought to be less free in dealing
with a legislative intent about case law.
298. Commission on Revision, supra note 91, at 228 (emphasis added). In discussing the
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Additionally, a group of congressional leaders, Fifth Circuit judges, com-
munity leaders, and commentators opposed the various proposals for divi-
sion out of a concern that such a division would undo or change the
prevailing precedents in the court.299 The Reorganization Act was passed
against the background of these two concerns.
The plain language of the statute itself supports the argument that Con-
gress intended to create two new circuits. The drafters of the Reorganiza-
tion Act were careful to establish the identity and maintain the
individuality of the former Fifth Circuit, new Fifth Circuit, and the Elev-
enth Circuit.3 0° Congress continued to emphasize the autonomy of each
court by assigning judges, authorizing places of holding court, and dis-
pensing the docket.301
The legislative history of the Act further evinces this congressional in-
tent. The statement of purpose contained in the House Report is conclu-
sive:
The purpose of the legislation is to divide the current Fifth Judicial Cir-
cuit into two new and autonomous circuits. The new Fifth will com-
prise the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, as well as the
District of the Canal Zone. The new Eleventh will comprise the
States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia.
The goal of the legislation is to meet societal change and growing
caseloads in the six States presently comprising the Fifth Circuit. It
accomplishes this by providing the residents, attorneys and litigants
who reside or litigate within those States with a new Federal judicial
structure which is capable of meeting the clear mandates of our judi-
cial system-the rendering of consistent, expeditious, fair and inex-
pensive justice. The two new circuits will preserve and promote the
vigor, integrity and independence of the illustrious parent court.302
The Report also repeatedly describes the legislation as creating "two com-
pletely autonomous circuits," 30 3 "two separate and autonomous cir-
cuits," 3°4  "two new and autonomous circuits, ' 30 5  and "two new
circuits.' '3 °6 Senator Heflin, who presented the Senate bill, described the
Fifth Circuit proposal, the Commission referred to "two new courts: a new fifth circuit...
and an eleventh circuit" and to "the new courts." Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added). But cf. id.
at 228 (referring to the "creation of [only] two new circuits" in proposing to split both the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits).
299. This has been a recurring theme. See sources cited in notes 84, 90, 91, 100, 106, 110,
125, 138, 164-66 supra.
300. The Fifth Circuit already had reorganized itself into two divisions, administered
separately and bound by precedents of each other. The Reorganization Act must have cre-
ated some additional autonomy. See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
301. See note 160 supra.
302. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at I (emphasis added). In its findings, the
committee concluded "[tihe two new circuits will preserve and promote the vigor, integrity
and independence of the parent court." Id. at 9.
303. Id. at 2.
304. Id. at 6.
305. Id. at 6-7.
306. Id. at 9. The report describes the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as "new" no fewer
than ten times. Id. at 6-9. But cf. id. at 10 (letter from Congressional Budget Office seems to
suggest only the Eleventh Circuit is new, while the Fifth Circuit is continued).
1981]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
proposal as "divid[ing] the present fifth circuit into two separate circuits
• ..the new fifth circuit . . . and . . . the eleventh circuit. ' 30 7 Senator
Stennis, an original cosponsor of the bill, spoke of "a new fifth circuit" and
a "new 11 th circuit," and introduced a resolution of the Mississippi State
Bar supporting the division of "the presently existing Fifth Circuit into two
completely autonomous Judicial Circuits. ' 30 8 Senator DeConcini, a sec-
ond cosponsor, described the bill as dividing the present court into "2 more
manageable circuits, a new 5th circuit and the 11 th circuit. '30 9 Senator
Cochran, a member of the Judiciary Committee, referred to the "new cir-
cuits."'310 In the House, Representative Kastenmeier introduced the sub-
committee's bill and explained that it would "divide the fifth judicial
circuit of the United States into two circuits . . . the new fifth circuit...
[and] the new 1 th circuit." 311I He explained that the bill, which eventually
was enacted, would create "a new judicial structure-two autonomous cir-
cuits."' 312 He said, "It is my view that the two new circuits will preserve
and promote the integrity and independence of the parent court. . . . I
predict that the split of this great court will produce two equally distin-
guished offsprings. ' 3 13 The testimony before the House subcommittee was
of a similar nature. 314
Clearly the judges of the two new courts of appeals would violate the
legislative intent of the Reorganization Act were they to attempt to make
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit binding on their panels. Congress
intended that the two new courts of appeals would spring forth full-grown,
like Athena from the head of Zeus, and the former Fifth Circuit soon
would pass from the scene. Congress neither intended nor designed that
the Fifth Circuit merely would give birth to the Eleventh, or that the Fifth
Circuit would be twice cloned.
Aside from the potential institutional conflicts between the surviving
former Fifth Circuit and the two new circuits, 3' 5 an absolute requirement
that all panels of the two new courts adhere to former Fifth Circuit prece-
dent would violate the mechanism of stare decisis in the two new courts.
Even the compromise rule proposed earlier disrupts the notion of stare
decisis in the context of the courts of appeals. 316 These approaches are
objectionable, however, because of their binding nature. The problem of
precedent may not be solved by a rigid application of stare decisis. The
307. 126 CONG. REC. S7321 (daily ed. June 18, 1980).
308. Id. at S7321.
309. Id. at S7322 (emphasis added).
310. Id. But see id. (remarks of Sen. Baker, implying a single new court was proposed).
311. 126 CONG. REC. H10,187, H10,188 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Hearing on H.R. 7665, supra note 138, at 6 (statement of Griffin B. Bell, on behalf of
the ABA), 12 (testimony of Althea T.L. Simmons on behalf of the NAACP), 17 (remarks of
Rep. Danielson), 26 (Circuit Judge Johnson as spokesman for Fifth Circuit Judicial Coun-
cil), 26 (judges' petition for split).
315. See notes 282-84 supra.
316. See text accompanying note 241 supra. This is so to the extent that the panel of the
new court is constrained from handling former Fifth Circuit precedent as merely persuasive.
[Vol. 35
DIVIDED FIFTH CIRCUIT
hypothetical Thomas v. Baker may be cited a "precedent" for the proposi-
tion that neither a panel nor the en banc court in the new circuits can
"hold" all former Fifth Circuit precedents binding on panels of the new
court.317 Thus, the remaining judicial option is a policy-level consen-
sus. 318 Because such an important policy should not be established at the
panel level, the en banc courts in the new circuits are the more appropriate
forums for such a pronouncement. 31 9 The en banc courts must decide ra-
tionally and then articulate their rationale.
The en banc courts should reject an absolute approach that would make
former Fifth Circuit precedent binding on their panels. While one compo-
nent of stare decisis is the deference of a court for its own prior deci-
sions,320 the legislative history of the Reorganization Act suggests that this
is not a relevant concern. Congress apparently intended the two new
courts of appeals to be autonomous and independent, one from another
and each from the former Fifth Circuit.32 1 This unique situation involves
a determination of the precedential impact in two new courts of case law
from a predecessor court. The rationale for stare decisis itself provides a
framework for analyzing the analogous, though unique, question
presented.
Judge Jerome Frank catalogued five general policy arguments advanced
in support of the doctrine of stare decisis. 322 Application of these ratio-
nales to the unique situation in the two new circuits obviates the use of an
absolute approach. Justice, the first rationale, requires that the court apply
to a second set of parties in a second case the same rule it had applied in a
prior case.323 Because the new Fifth and new Eleventh Circuits are in-
dependent and autonomous, they have not applied any rule to any parties
in any prior cases.324 No good reason appears to require the panels of the
new courts to perpetuate error, and a panel should be as free to determine
error in former Fifth Circuit case law as in any persuasive authority. A
second argument for stare decisis is the need for stability,325 a need based
principally on the notion that individuals rely upon case law. An absolute
rule would serve this criterion, although at the cost of perpetuating some
injustice. As an alternative to an absolute approach, a panel of the new
317. See text accompanying 270-77 supra.
318. See notes 192-96 supra.
319. See notes 224-30 supra.
320. See Wise, supra note 220, at 1043-44.
321. See text accompanying notes 297-314 supra. The application of the rule of in-
terpanel accord also might violate FED. R. APP. P. 35, which allows for en banc review only
when "necessary to secure or maintain uniformity" or in cases of "exceptional importance.'
Application of the rule would not be necessary to maintain uniformity within the two new
circuits. That the new en banc courts may differ with the former Fifth Circuit in unimpor-
tant cases also is likely. Convening an en banc court in such circumstances could violate the
spirit of rule 35. See United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Lewis, 475 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1972).
322. J. FRANK, supra note 198, at 267-71.
323. Id. at 267-68.
324. Nowhere here is it suggested that the new Fifth and the new Eleventh Circuits
should not adopt the rule of interpanel accord with respect to their own panel decisions.
325. J. FRANK, supra note 198, at 268-71.
19811
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
court with authority to overrule former Fifth Circuit precedents could con-
sider the extent of actual reliance on such precedents and determine sepa-
rately whether to apply the new ruling prospectively only. 3 2 6 A third
rationale for stare decisis is its contribution to the "'beauty and symme-
try'" of the common law. 327 As a general proposition, Frank rejects this
notion of aesthetics as "ridiculous. ' 328 It seems even more ridiculous and
somewhat illogical to suggest that the symmetry of the law of the former
Fifth Circuit should remain intact after two new courts have replaced it.
Another argument in favor of stare decisis suggests that completely ad
hoc decisions make the law "unknowable" and prevent members of the
legal profession from acquiring and trading in a knowledge of the law.
329
Surely, an attorney does not have a vested interest in bad law, whatever
professional stake there is in hard cases. An absolute rule would be an
overbroad means toward achieving this goal. A flexible approach would
permit room for even more lawyering, in order to convince the new circuit
to turn its back on the law of the former Fifth Circuit.
Frank's final argument for stare decisis is simply "convenience of the
judges," for it is easier to adjudicate in a settled system. 330 For the new
courts to follow the former Fifth Circuit precedents would be simple, pre-
dictable, and such a practice would be convenient for the judges. Never-
theless, this argument, however appealing, cannot sustain the
administration of injustice.331 The cost of preventing the new courts from
overruling a wrong decision seems too expensive in terms of perpetuating
any error. Also, requiring the cumbersome en banc procedure in every
instance would be inconsistent with the convenience rationale.
332
On a policy level, the rule that a court should defer to its own prior
decisions is irrelevant to the predicament of the new Eleventh and new
Fifth Circuits. Without some overreaching reason for departure, the gen-
eral rule already applicable in decisions between two courts of appeals
should apply. 333 While the decision of another court of appeals is not
326. Id. at 270.
327. Id. at 271.
328. Id.
329. Id.; see note 168 supra.
330. J. FRANK, supra note 198, at 271.
331. Id.
332. Moving from justification to explanation, Frank suggests that the foremost reason
for the precedent system is habit, a specific form of the human condition of general, inevita-
ble inertia. Id. at 271-74. A less than absolute rule would allow habit much sway. In the
absence of any serious contention that habit should be exalted over all else, this is enough.
333. To require the new Eleventh and new Fifth Circuits to apply the stare decisis of the
former Fifth Circuit would be not unlike the approach in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). See note 186 supra. That decision, however, was based on overarching concerns
of federalism and comity between national and state court systems as inscribed in the First
Judiciary Act and, perhaps, the Constitution. C. WRIGHT, supra note 187, §§ 55-56. See
generally Harnett & Thornton, Precedent in the Eerie-Tompkins Manner. A Decade in Retro-
spect, N.Y.U.L.Q. 770 (1949); Note, The Constitutional Power of Congress to Control Proce-
dure in the Federal Courts, 56 Nw. L. REv. 560 (1961); Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1952). Based on such weighty concerns, the Erie decision "revived the doc-
trine of stare decists and [gave] it a setting that it never before had." E. PATTERSON, supra
[Vol. 35
DIVIDED FIFTH CIRCUIT
otherwise controlling authority, in the absence of its own precedents a
court will defer to the persuasiveness of precedent from other circuits un-
less it is deemed manifestly erroneous. 334 The absolute rule of interpanel
accord should not be applied between two independent and autonomous
circuits. 335 The congressional failure to take positive action to make for-
mer Fifth Circuit case law binding336 and apparent intention to constitute
separately the two new courts of appeals strengthens the argument for this
approach. 337
The absolute rule of stare decisis suffers from its own ephemeral charac-
ter. Professor Gilmore defined the doctrine as "the idea that a court is
bound, in deciding a current case, to follow its own past decisions in 'like'
cases. Which current cases are 'like' which past cases is a point on which
opposing counsel tend to disagree. ' 338 Distinguishing Fifth Circuit hold-
ing from Fifth Circuit dictum is a difficult task for any court, and one often
incapable of satisfactory performance. The absolute rule of stare decisis
based on this false and formalistic distinction denigrates substance in the
process. 339 The classic tradition of stare decisis has much more flexibility
than an absolute rule would recognize.340
The specific policy underlying the rule of interpanel accord is an attempt
to further the concept of the law of the circuit, which requires uniformity
in the application of the law by a court.341 Because the court is comprised
of numerous judges, sitting in many different multiples of three, some
mechanism for maintaining one voice, the voice of the majority of the
judges, is necessary. Applying the rule of interpanel accord across circuit
note 198, § 3.30, at 304. The Erie doctrine requires the deciding federal court to follow state
court precedent without permitting the traditional overruling mechanism. Only for very
good reasons should a court be required to determine "what the rule of stare decisis means
with enough precision to apply it without the traditional safety valve, the authority of courts
to create law interstitially." Id. No such weighty concerns are inherent in the division of the
Fifth Circuit. See id. § 3.33, at 320-24. The two new courts would not have available the
certification procedure provided by many states to certify questions to the former Fifth Cir-
cuit. See, e.g., Adam, George, Lee, Schulte & Ward v. Westinghouse, 597 F.2d 570, 576-77
n.2 (5th Cir. 1979) (Hill, J., dissenting, would have certified the state law question the major-
ity decided).
334. H. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 103, at 333 (1912). See, e.g., In re
Eartherton, 271 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1959).
335. If, as some suggest, the rule of interpanel accord makes no sense within a circuit,
then its application between two autonomous circuits would be nonsensical. See Speigner v.
Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
336. See text accompanying notes 174-91 supra.
337. See text accompanying notes 297-314 supra.
338. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 130-31 n.32 (1971).
339. For example, footnote 7 in United States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 943-44 n.7 (5th Cir.
1979), a self-proclaimed dictum, is the most significant aspect of the case. The castigation of
prosecutorial overzealousness in Part III.A. of the opinion in United States v. Wilson, 578
F.2d 67, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1978), albeit a dictum, is of much more lasting significance than the
holding.
340. See generally H. BLACK, supra note 334; J. WELLS, RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE
DECISIS (1879). The amount of flexibility inherent in the principle of stare decisis is the
subject of great debate. Compare, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 198, with J. FRANK, Supra
note 198, with Wise, supra note 220.
341. Uniformity in decisionmaking was a key concern in the congressional decision to
divide the Fifth Circuit. See H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 138, at 3.
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lines, however, would frustrate one underlying institutional value of this
component of stare decisis, control of the law of the circuit. The rule of
interpanel accord would require the panels of the two new circuits to fol-
low a rule of law presumably established by a judicial majority of another
circuit. While the judges in the new circuits initially will be former Fifth
Circuit judges, with time that will change. 342 The majority of the judges
on both new courts would be deprived of the opportunity to implement its
views efficiently by means of a representative panel decision whenever a
former Fifth Circuit precedent exists.343
Applying the rule of interpanel accord across circuit lines also fails to
advance the underlying institutional value of stare decisis, that of main-
taining uniformity among panel decisions. The first decision on an issue in
the new circuit will establish the precedent to be followed; subsequent
panel decisions must be uniform with that initial decision. Requiring the
first decision to be consistent with former Fifth Circuit precedent does not
achieve uniformity within the new circuit. The requirement does promote
some stability in the law between old and new circuits. This stability, as
opposed to uniformity, is evanescent, however, because the new circuit's en
banc court can overrule the former court's precedent.344
A rigid and absolute policy approach to the application of former Fifth
Circuit precedent therefore does not withstand scrutiny. While there is no
question that the law of the former Fifth Circuit should be deemed
uniquely persuasive for a time, no sufficiently weighty policy justification
exists for requiring panels of the new courts to determine what the rule of
former Fifth Circuit stare decisis means with enough precision to follow it,
but without the authority to create law interstitially.
345
IV.
The issues addressed here are important ones. As the courts of appeals
assume a greater role in developing the law of the land, the body of that
law will grow, and more significant differences between the law of the cir-
cuits will develop. As Congress continues its preoccupation with the inter-
mediate tier of the federal courts, more redrawing of boundaries doubtless
will be considered. In the future, Congress should legislate with respect to
the viability of precedents across redrawn boundary lines. Today, without
an express congressional edict, the new Fifth Circuit and the new Eleventh
Circuit must decide which choice to make and how to make it.346
342. In fact, most of the judges in each new circuit have been appointed so recently that
their interest in the former Fifth Circuit precedents is inherited. President Carter appointed
7 of 12 judges on the new Eleventh Circuit and 8 of 14 judges on the new Fifth Circuit.
Hearing on H.R. 7665, supra note 138, at 59-62.
343. If there is a former precedent from any other circuit, however, the panel may disa-
gree. See notes 275-76 supra.
344. The compromise rule would interfere with these same values in a similar manner,
although to a lesser extent. See text accompanying notes 239-49 supra.
345. E. PATTERSON, supra note 198, § 3.30, at 304.
346. The new circuits should develop new rules for the courts in a formal, public man-
ner. See Weinstein, supra note 232, at 963-64. See also Roney, The Bar Answers the Chal-
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This Article raises more questions than it answers, which is the luxury of
commentators. Part of the responsibility of judging is to answer hard
questions such as these. To end this Article as it began, with the words of a
great judge: "We shall have to feel our way here as elsewhere in the law.
Somewhere between worship of the past and exaltation of the present, the
path of safety is found." 347
lenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60, 64 (1976) (quoting ABA Proposal, "Recommended Court Procedure
to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and Free Press").
347. B. CARDOZO, supra note 198, at 160. See also A. FRANTZ, How COURTS DECIDE
63-64 (1968).
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1. Rhode Island was added to the eastern circuit by Act of June 23, 1790, ch. 21, 1 Stat.
128.
2. Vermont was added to the eastern circuit by Act of March 2, 1791, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 197.
3. North Carolina was added to the southern circuit by Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 17, 1 Stat.
126.
4. Circuit court powers were conferred upon the district courts of the independent dis-
tricts of Maine and Kentucky by Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. By Act
of March 30, 1820, ch. 27, 3 Stat. 554, Maine was added to the first circuit.
5. Circuit court powers were conferred upon the district courts of Tennessee by Act of
January 31, 1797, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 496.
6. By Act of February 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee consti-
tuted the seventh circuit. By Act of January 28, 1863, ch.13, 12 Stat. 637, Ohio and
Michigan constituted the seventh circuit.
7. Kentucky and Tennessee were made independent districts by Act of April 29, 1802, ch.
31, 2 Stat. 156.
8. Circuit court powers were conferred upon the district courts of the following independ-
ent districts: Louisiana by Act of April 8, 1812, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 703; Indiana by Act of
March 3, 1817, ch. 100, 3 Stat. 390; Mississippi by Act of April 2, 1818, ch. 29, 3 Stat.
413; Illinois by Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 70, 3 Stat. 502; Alabama by Act of April 21,
1830, ch. 47, 3 Stat. 564; Missouri by Act of March 16, 1822, ch. 12, 3 Stat. 653; Arkan-
sas by Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 100, 5 Stat. 50; Michigan by Act of July 1, 1835, ch. 234,
5 Stat. 62; Florida by Act of March 3, 1845, ch. 75, 5 Stat. 788; Iowa by Act of March 3,
1845, ch. 76, 5 Stat. 789; Texas by Act of December 29, 1845, ch. 1, 9 Stat. 1; Minnesota
by Act of May I1, 1858, ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285; and Kansas by Act of January 29, 1861, ch.
20, 12 Stat. 128.
9. Alabama and Louisiana constituted the fifth circuit by Act of August 16, 1842, ch. 180,
5 Stat. 507.
10. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia constituted the sixth circuit by Act of
August 16, 1842, ch. 180, 5 Stat. 507. South Carolina was divided into the eastern and
western districts by Act of February 21, 1825, ch. I1, 3 Stat. 726. Circuit court powers
were conferred upon the district court for the western district by Act of August 16,
1856, ch. 119, 11 Stat. 43. A circuit for the western district was established by Act of
February 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655. Terms for the circuit court for the districts of
South Carolina were regulated by Act of April 26, 1890, ch. 165, 26 Stat. 71.
11. Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin constituted the eighth circuit by Act of January 28,
1863, ch. 131, 12 Stat. 637. Wisconsin was transferred to the ninth circuit by Act of
February 9, 1863, 12 Stat. 648.
12. California constituted a separate circuit by Act of March 2, 1885, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631
and, with Oregon, constituted the tenth circuit by Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12
Stat. 794.
13. Virginia was added to the fourth circuit by Act of August 16, 1842, ch. 180, 5 Stat. 507.
Nevada was added to the tenth circuit by Act of February 27, 1865, ch. 64, 13 Stat. 440.
North Carolina was added to the fourth circuit by Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat.
576. Nebraska was added to the eighth circuit by Act of March 25, 1867, ch. 7, 15 Stat.
5. Colorado was added to the eighth circuit by Act of June 26, 1876, ch. 147, 19 Stat.
61. Montana was added to the ninth circuit by Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25
Stat. 682. North Dakota and South Dakota were added to the eighth circuit by Act of
February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 682. Washington was added to the ninth circuit by
Act of February 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 682. Idaho was added to the ninth circuit by
Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, 26 Stat. 217. Wyoming was added to the eighth circuit by
Act of July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 225.
14. Certain circuit court powers were conferred on the district courts of Alaska and writs of
error in criminal cases were authorized to issue from the circuit court for the district of
Oregon to the district court of Alaska by Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
15. Circuit courts were established in Arkansas and Mississippi by Act of February 6, 1889,
ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655.
16. Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee constituted the sixth circuit by
Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576.
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17. Ohio and Indiana constituted the seventh circuit by Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12
Stat. 576.
18. Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois constituted the eighth circuit by Act of July 15, 1862,
ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576.
19. Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota constituted the ninth circuit by Act of July 15,
1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576.
20. Puerto Rico was added to the First Circuit by Act of January 28, 1915, ch. 22, 38 Stat.
803.
21. The Virgin Islands were added to the Third Circuit by Act of February 13, 1925, ch.
229, 43 Stat. 936.
22. The district of the Canal Zone was added to the Fifth Circuit by Act of February 13,
1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
23. Decisions of the district courts in Alaska were made reviewable in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals by Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
24. Hawaii was included in the Ninth Circuit by Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1131.
25. Arizona was included in the Ninth Circuit by Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-
840, 45 Stat. 1346.
26. Oklahoma was included in the Eighth Circuit by Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1131.
27. New Mexico was included in the Eighth Circuit by Act of March 4, 1921, ch. 149, 41
Stat. 1361.
28. Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico constituted the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals by Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45
Stat. 1346.
29. Guam was added to the Ninth Circuit by Act of October 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-248,
65 Stat. 723.
30. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was recognized as a separate
circuit by Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 870.

